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
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DSA is as much yours as it is ours!



This is but a small step, in a long walk to growing and excelling. Welcome, dear reader, to the first copy of the **Defence & Security Alert**. What you hold in your hands has been crafted in our minds, and created by our hands. It has been months since the idea was born, to the first copy that you have in your hands. There was much threshing of ideas and concepts to the final structure. As we grow the basic structure will remain the same, but ideas will change and evolve. Change, after all, is the fundamental law of nature as the **Bhagvad Gita** said so many millennia ago.

All births are exciting times, as they spawn a frenzy of emotions. From boundless joy at the creation, to the faintest hint of trepidation about a smooth-sailing growth. No growth is possible without the sternest of tests. And you, dear reader, are the catalyst for that growth. You are the fulcrum upon which we will grow. This is your magazine. Your ideas and suggestions are what will drive us in our endeavour at making D&SA a success. So please keep that picture in mind as you read the first issue. It is as much yours as it is ours. Any, and all, suggestions that you may have are always welcome. In fact those will be essential part of our relationship. We will be driven by your thoughts and proposals. What you sketch will influence our drawings. So keep the inspiration flowing. And we will flow with you.

What we have structured is a mix of defence, strategy, internal and external security, as well as the technology aspects that go with all these subjects. There is a requirement for a basic understanding of our armed forces, and we will remain focused on them. Every once in a while there will be a feature that doesn't necessarily fit into the straightjacketed idea of defence and security. But we don't want to exist in a straightjacket, for it stunts growth. There will be sufficient flexibility in our functioning, and thinking, to cater for that.

We do believe that Naxal violence is one of the most serious threats to the country, and have, therefore, devoted the first cover story to it. We will continue to come back to this subject. Even if the subsequent issues have different cover stories, we would like to address such fundamental issues on a continual basis. They remain the core of our national security diagram in the near term future. The whole concept of internal security management needs to be continually addressed, and we will be doing just that. And we would like you to address the issues as well.

The primary belief at **D&SA** is that the reader must be at the centre of all planning. So along with the suggestions, we would equally welcome your contributions. In the first issue you will find amongst the finest Indian brains in the defence and security fields. We do believe that there are many more such Indians all over the country, and we offer them this platform to express their opinions, and share their views. Knowledge, after all, is only its worth when it is shared. We're sharing our creation with you, for it is yours as much as ours. Enjoy it.

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Mission Statement

The power of a king lies in his mighty arms... Security of the citizens at peace time is very important because State is the only saviour of the men and women who get affected only because of the negligence of the State.
—Chanakya

let's take a stand...



Dear reader,

Most of us believe, defence and security are the domain of army, police and government only and are in no way linked to the everyday realm of a common man. This mental makeup of people made me mull over this initiative—**Defence & Security Alert (DSA)**. DSA is intended to provide a distinct platform to aware society about defence and security related issues.

India has always been exposed to terror attacks, riots and unrest in various forms. In the event of such attacks, in recent past, we Indians have become very vulnerable. We have understood, terror may strike in any form, at any place—not only destroying strategic targets but, posing grave threat to the global dreams of the country. It is, therefore, essential to set up an easy-to-access communication platform—so that people are better initiated in matters of defence and security, and subsequently better prepared for contingencies. With this initiative, we have a strong desire to unite our countrymen to stand against this demon and fight. And, this time, fight it to the finish...

We, through our 75 years of expertise in publishing, are all set to put forth, **Defence & Security Alert (DSA)**, a new-wave English monthly. Through this magazine, we are making a genuine attempt to bring in focus, everything related to Defence and Security—be it equipment, organisations, industries, government policies, strategies or any other concerning information / current affairs. Determined to strengthen India's global prospects, we are also going to focus lot more on internal as well as external security-issues in forthcoming editions. Our readers may find variance in the quantity of articles but the quality won't be compromised.

I am sure, those who are looking for some exclusive reading material on defence and security related fields, **DSA** will prove to be a reliable and commanding source. I can assure our readers that they can count on us for our aptitude and wide range of expertise.

We are going to make this specialist field more special and widely read among policy makers, think tanks, researchers, defence and research organisations, police lobby, libraries and youths.

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
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Harsh V. Pant



security challenge shattering india's global dream

Amid all the buzz about a vibrant, new India ready to dominate the global stage, there remain a few home truths about its limitations to cope with tough security challenges. Lack of strategic vision, coupled with ineffective State agencies, seems to be the root cause behind a gradual collapse in the country's authority. But unless India re-establishes its control within the territorial borders, its aspirations to play a larger role beyond its boundaries will never be taken seriously. Can we finally deliver on promises of future greatness? An insight...

he recent Maoist offensive in West Bengal has shaken the very foundation of the country's control and revealed, once again, how callous many of the previous governments have been in tackling the Maoist groups and other such ultra outfits who challenge our sovereignty. But how has it affected its citizens and their perception?

The Indian voter has, once again, shocked the political establishment by decisively voting in favour of the Congress party. The common man, disenchanted as he is by the shenanigans of regional parties, wants a stable, coherent government at the centre and Congress is the only viable option. Consequently, Dr. Manmohan Singh happens to be the only Prime Minister after Jawaharlal Nehru to be voted back to power after completing a full five-year term. He is heading a government without the support of the left parties and various other regional parties who had made his government look weak and indecisive during his previous term. But the new government is yet to demonstrate that it plans to use the people's mandate in a more effective manner in a bid to tackle various security challenges that confront the nation.

Required: Sustainable growth, sense of direction

The biggest challenge for India is to sustain the economic growth rates that the country has enjoyed in recent years. Everything else is of secondary importance. China has been enjoying double-digit growth rates for the last two decades while the Indian story is not even a decade old. Economic growth underpins India's ability to provide adequately for the nation's defence needs.

As Indian armed forces become increasingly ambitious, the country has emerged as one of the biggest arms buyers in

the global market over the past few years.

However, this would not have been possible without its economic success. In line with India's gradually broadening strategic horizons, its military acquisitions are witnessing a marked shift from conventional land-based systems to means of power projections such as airborne refuelling and long-range missiles. But the continuation of this trend is premised on India's ability to sustain its present economic growth trajectory.

However, resources alone are not enough. A sense of direction is needed which can only happen if appropriate institutions are in place. It is often assumed that India has the necessary institutional wherewithal to translate its growing economic and military capabilities into global influence even though the country continues to suffer from weak administrative capacity in most areas of policy-making. But India's emergence as a major power is still a matter of potential. In the realm of foreign and security policies, successive Indian governments have given short shrift to the building of institutional capacity. A big reason why a culture of long-term strategic thinking has failed to evolve in India is this lack of meaningful institutions that can effectively leverage nation's resources in the service of clearly defined political goals.

In foreign policy and national security issues, the State institutions often do not work because the governments of the day do not want them to work. So the onus falls on the bureaucracy which is not organised to think strategically. Moreover, it remains insular, not interested in making use of the wider knowledge base.

Unfortunately, a wider culture of non-governmental academics and think tanks is largely absent as well. India's higher education system remains weak in producing the kind of output that would enhance the country's ability to project itself and its values more potently on the global stage.

So, what is ailing India?

The main issue that plagues India is that there be an institutionalised apparatus within the State if there is a lack of sophisticated academic and media discourse outside the State. The broader decimation of Indian academia has had immense consequences for what the State can do by way of institutionalisation.

The present nited rogressive

From Left-wing extremism to Right-wing religious fundamentalism, the country is facing multiple challenges that threaten to derail the story of a rising India. Therefore, India has been rightly described as a strong society with a weak State, unable to harness its national power for the national purpose.

An effective institutional framework would not only identify the challenges but also develop a coherent strategy to deal with those. It will organise and motivate the bureaucracy, and persuade and inform the public.

Alliance (U) government came to power in 2004 promising that it would make the National Security Council (NSC) a professional and effective institution unlike its conservative predecessor, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). But A, too, has failed to make it work in an optimal manner so that the NSC may anticipate national security threats, co-ordinate the management of national security and prompt long-term planning by generating bold and innovative ideas.

An effective institutional framework would not only identify the challenges but also develop a coherent strategy to deal with those. It will organise and motivate the bureaucracy, and persuade and inform the public. The NSC, by itself, is not a panacea. It had been proven time and again, especially when the NSC in the NDA failed to mediate successfully in the bureaucratic wars and could not coordinate policies effectively. But the lack of an effective NSC in India truly reflects the country's ad hoc decision-making process in the realm of foreign policy. And the outcome of not once in its more than six-decade long history has India produced a national security strategy document.

His lack of strategic orientation has prevented India from tackling internal issues central to its foreign and security policies. And India is witnessing a gradual collapse in its authority. From left-wing extremism to right-wing religious fundamentalism, the country is facing multiple challenges that threaten to derail the story of a rising India. Therefore, India has been rightly described as a strong society with a weak State, unable to harness its national power for the national purpose.

India is rapidly becoming a vulnerable target for Islamist extremism with some estimates suggesting, rather astoundingly, that it is second only to Iraq in the number of lives lost to terrorism over the last three years. The country has long prided itself on the fact that not one person in a country that has the second largest Muslim population in the world is linked to Al-Qaeda or any international terror plot. This has turned out to be a myth with the exposure that since 1993, every major Islamist urban terror cell in the country has witnessed a pre-dominance of Indian nationals.

India is fast emerging both as a target and a recruitment base for organisations like Al-Qaeda and attacks are being carried out with impunity by home-grown jihadist groups, trained and aided by organisations in neighbouring Pakistan and Bangladesh. Similar to Al-Qaeda, the most prominent terrorist group in India today, the Indian Mujahideen, is a loose coalition of jihadists, bound together by ideological affiliation and personal linkages with its leadership scattered across the country. Indian security forces are now fighting terrorists in the heart of its major cities like Mumbai and New Delhi, and the last five years have been deemed as the worst in the country's history of fighting terror.

Meanwhile, the Maoist insurgency has spread from the margins to the limelight as the Prime Minister identifies the Maoists as the greatest internal security threat.

The Maoists have taken the fight to the Indian heartland to the vast swathe of territory comprising of impoverished villages in central India. Today, the Indian

In the realm of foreign and security policies, successive Indian governments have given short shrift to the building of institutional capacity.

Prime Ministry lists more than 100 districts as being Maoist-affected, and the combined force of the Maoist insurgents has been estimated to be somewhere between 10,000 and 20,000 armed fighters and at least 10,000 active supporters.

In case you want to know how precarious the state of affairs is, it will be pertinent to mention that at least 8 security personnel were killed last year in a Maoist attack on the police. It is the second-largest loss of life in India's more-than-five-decade-long battle against insurgencies. Yet, the Indian government is either unable or unwilling to come up with a credible policy response to this challenge.

Unless the country establishes control within its territorial borders, its aspirations to play a larger role beyond its boundaries will never be taken seriously.

India rising: Myth or reality?

The world media and India's elite talk about India's rise, often not realising that the country beset with rising Islamist extremism, Maoist insurgency and growing and conflicting demands of myriad interest groups is rapidly losing the ability to have its writ run over a large swathe of its territory. The very idea of India is under siege with significant erosion in the legitimacy of the State and the time has come to restore its credibility.

The Indian elite do have a growing sense that their country is an emerging great power, an important player on the global stage. Yet, the State seems unable to fully leverage the opportunities presented by the country's economic rise.

It is true that tensions are inherent when there is a face-off between the requirements of a great foreign policy and the complications of a democratic multinational State, as was evidenced by the negotiations over the US-India nuclear deal. Policy-making in democracies is often a messy process, full of complexities, but the last five years saw a near-paralytic fragmentation of authority in the Indian polity to the point where a sense of drift was prevailing on a whole range of crucial national security issues. It was easy for the Congress party to blame the coalition architecture for that drift. But now that the voters have given the party a second chance, it is incumbent upon it to rise to the challenge. **DSA**

The writer teaches in King's College, London and is presently a visiting professor at Bangalore.





For more than 50 years, Kashmir has been a flashpoint between India and Pakistan. We have long rejected the idea of a plebiscite and the Valley has witnessed unprecedented terror as Pak-based groups fight against Indian control. While bilateral talks fail to produce an amicable solution, the conflict spreads far beyond the contentious Line of Control (LoC) and impacts the entire nation. Kashmir is an acid test for India's comprehensive State power. But can we rise to the challenge and remove the roadblocks? Key questions about Kashmir answered...

Ajit Doval



more roadblocks

ahead...

Issues become complex when their loci are determined by intertwined and mutually conflicting variables. Kashmir, one of the longest enduring conflicts of the modern times is a classic case in point. What makes the problem intractable and the response difficult is that any initiative taken to address one vector has collateral impact on others and it is often unfavourable.

Past blunders return to haunt

It all started as a simple problem of addressing the concerns of a recalcitrant Maharaja of a princely state—a problem that is more personal than politico-strategic. But in the last six decades, both Pakistan and India added new variables to it—the former having a locus-standi on an issue that it had none and the latter guilty of faulty assessments of Pakistan and Kashmir politics, as well as its own capabilities.

Time inconsistent and segmental approach in the past not only added new complexities to the problem but expanded the scope and intensity of the existing ones. Illustratively, to deal with an obstinate Maharaja, Nehru brought in Sheikh Abdullah and his National Conference to counter him, although they had no locus-standi under the accession arrangement. This linked local politics to an issue which had national security, sovereignty and territorial implications. The wrong approach was evident when Sheikh Abdullah had to be kept under prolonged detention and the problem did not end even when the accord was signed in 1975. To gain support of the Valley Muslims, Article 370 was introduced which created further complexity in the relationship between the Union and the state, and instead of achieving emotional integration, only helped the divisive forces. By allowing the state to have its own constitution, criminal law and ill-defined relationship with the Union, the integrative process got negated.

Pakistan complicated the issue by adding variables of 'religion' and 'violence' when in the name of Islam it conceived, resourced and mounted a proxy invasion by the Razakars in 1947. In this regard, no better evidence is required than that presented by Maj. Gen. Akbar Khan, who was in charge of the entire operation and later narrated the story in his book *Raiders of Kashmir*, giving full details of Pakistan's involvement in arming, organising, co-ordinating and financing the whole act.



To deal with an obstinate *Maharaja*, Nehru brought in Sheikh Abdullah and his National Conference to counter him, although they had no locus-standi under the accession arrangement. This linked local politics to an issue which had national security, sovereignty and territorial implications.

Nehru gave unwarranted locus-standi to Pakistan in India's internal affairs by engaging our neighbour in talks and correspondence over Kashmir when he should have squarely focused on vacating the aggression and driving the invaders out of the area that had been legally ceded to India. He thus made Pakistan a stakeholder in the Kashmir affair. Moreover, much before he took it to the UN, Nehru had unilaterally declared in an All India Radio broadcast (November 2, 1947) that India was "prepared to have a referendum held under international auspices like the

United Nations and shall accept their verdict". Thus, he not only internationalised the Kashmir issue but declared that its accession to India was only tentative and conditional. On January 1, 1948, when India took the matter to the UN Security Council, it fell into the trap of Pakistan who made Kashmir an international territorial dispute, much to India's disadvantage. Since then, at every turn of events, the situation has got more complicated. And Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's Joint Communiqué in Sharm-el-Sheikh is the latest goof-up in the series.

Pak-initiated terror: The role ISI plays

While the old complexities continue to haunt us in their original or mutated form, new ones have emerged to complicate things further. First in the list is the use of terrorism by Pakistan as an integral part of its state policy to achieve its strategico-political objectives in J&K. Militancy in J&K is essentially a low-intensity external aggression launched by Pakistan, an asymmetric adversary using the Jihadis to

bleed India. Organised under the banner of different *tanzims* (religious outfits), young people are indoctrinated during ISI-supported seminars, trained in camps run by supplicant organisations like Hizbul Mujahideen and Lashkar-e-Taiba, weaponised and financed by the ISI and finally launched into the Indian territory through the Line of Control (LoC) with the help of Pakistani Rangers or third countries providing them travel documents. ISI also facilitates their collaborative networking with underworld criminal gangs, gun-runners, drug traffickers, currency counterfeiters,

The right path for India

After the polls, the Hurriyat, with its factionalism, poor public image and low credibility of its propaganda, has lost much of its steam. In contrast, India has gained substantially on the internal front although the reach and quality of governance call for major improvements. Local politicians need to be more responsible and responsive, particularly when addressing issues with high emotional content. The secessionist forces are often able to seize the initiative from them and turn public protests into violent agitations in a bid to promote anti-India sentiments or disrupt communal harmony. Taking into consideration the above backdrop, following vectors need to be factored while formulating our national policy for J&K:

- » In spite of expediency and tactical posturing, Pakistan harbours a compulsive hostility against India which is a complex product of psychological and religious fixation constituting Pakistan's state idea and its vision of emerging as the "fortress of Islam." And there is no evidence that a new state idea will emerge to substitute the traditional one, nurtured so long. Apparent moderation in approach is due to compulsions and expediency and not because of strategic shift. Hence, it

has short-time consistency coterminous with continuation of the compulsion. India, therefore, should develop a long-term vision and strategic plan to deal with its recalcitrant western neighbour. And there should be a national consensus cutting across the party lines.

- » J&K is a Muslim majority state and the religious factor will continue to play an important role in political proclivities of the people, their perception of Pakistan and Pakistan's ploy to exploit religious demography to its advantage. With changing ground realities, the form and direction may vary but the fundamentals will endure.

- » Nuclearisation of Pakistan has limited India's conventional military options. Pakistan estimates that India has been forced to raise its tolerance threshold many notches high, providing Pakistan near immunity from Indian military response. Pakistan will continue to use the cost-effective option of covert action against the asymmetric India. India will have to think of building capabilities that work as effective deterrents against Pakistan exercising this option. Should Pakistan still go for it, the attendant costs should be made unaffordable through a well-thought-out action plan.

- » India, with its exploitable socio-political fault-lines, size and diversity, soft governance and democratic liberties, provide scope and opportunity for subversive and disruptive activities at an extensive scale. Bangladesh is fast getting radicalised and the subversion of a small section of Indian Muslims opens up new operational opportunities for Pakistan. Global conflicts of Islam and revolution in informatics have started influencing the mindset of the Muslims globally and Indian Muslims cannot be insulated from this phenomenon. Pakistan is aware of the possibilities that it offers and has started entrenching itself through multi-role covert modules which have serious security implications for India.

- » The existing status quo in J&K, although not in conformity with India's legitimate claims, should not be

allowed to be altered to India's disadvantage. The present position in terms of territory, political and constitutional arrangements, management and control of borders, access control etc. should constitute the minimum acceptable position in any settlement. Pakistan, if not punished for waging a covert offensive against India, should, at least, not be rewarded for it. Any concession by India will be seen as India's susceptibility to terrorist pressures and will strengthen the forces of terror, violence and fundamentalism in the long run. Till a final settlement is firmed up on all points of detail, India should not prematurely dilute its principled position. The Indian position on J&K exists as defined under Article 1(3) of the constitution of India encompassing the entire state of J&K, including Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). This is further reinforced by the constitution of J&K and the all-party Resolution of the Parliament;

- » Rolling back of terrorism and dismantling its infrastructure in Pakistan should be a prerequisite to carry forward any political process. The assurances of action taken must be verifiable and the impact should be implicitly visible. Indian nationals accused of heinous

offences and enjoying Pak hospitality must be handed over as the minimum test of Pakistan's sincerity and changed intentions.

- » War against terrorism must be fought with total determination. Any slackening of efforts or thinning out the troops till normalcy is restored would be inadvisable. No confusing signals should be given to Pakistan, the terrorist cadres or people of J&K through ambiguous moves and statements. The government must not drag its feet in executing the sentence awarded by the apex court and Afzal Guru is a case in point. The safe return of Kashmiri pundits to the valley would be the empirical test to judge that the area has been freed from the forces of violence and terror.

- » Any implicit or explicit suggestion which undermines India's absolute sovereignty over areas under its control in J&K should be jettisoned from any agenda of bilateral talks. This includes the right to deploy and maintain troops, management of borders, exercise of legislative, executive and judicial functions as laid down by the country's laws and constitution. Sovereignty is indivisible and cannot be shared. As far as devolution of powers to the states is concerned, it is an ongoing process in a democracy and purely a matter of internal political management. Pakistan cannot be allowed any space in dictating or influencing it.

- » The Hurriyat has no representative character and should not be accepted as an articulator of wishes and aspirations of the Kashmiri people. While efforts should be made to bring them in mainstream national politics, it will be a folly to accord them legitimacy and credibility through our acts of commission and omission. Their self-proclaimed role as a "bridge" between India and Pakistan or "Crusaders of Kashmiri Unity" should be snubbed.

- » On national security issues like the J&K, India should exercise total decisional autonomy. No third-party intervention, prompting or pressure to influence the decisions should be allowed.



border smugglers, radical Muslim outfits and so on who provide them logistic, infrastructure, intelligence and, at times, financial support. It also calibrates violence level, target selection, timings of major terrorist depredations and co-ordination of various Jihadi groups' activities to meet their strategico-tactical objectives.

In spite of the dwindling headcount, ISI has been able to maintain the terrorists' strength in J&K somewhere between 2,800 and 3,300 for nearly two decades. Similarly, notwithstanding the large quantities of weapons and explosives seized, besides fencing and other border-strengthening measures implemented by the security forces, ISI has been able to ensure unhindered supply of terrorist hardware to

the militants. Although 22, 064 terrorists have been killed and nearly 82,000 weapons (mostly AK series of rifles, sub-machine guns and rocket launchers) have been seized, ISI has been able to replenish the losses on a continuing basis. This, singularly, has been the organisation's greatest success.

There has been a decline, though, in the intensity of violence since 2001. But to interpret it as a change in Pakistan's strategic objectives or its denouncement of terrorism as an instrument of state policy would be a gross strategic miscalculation. In reality, the Pak ISI feels that raising the ante of terrorist violence in J&K does not pressurise the

Nehru had unilaterally declared in an All India Radio broadcast (November 2, 1947) that India was "prepared to have a referendum held under international auspices like the United Nations and shall accept their verdict".

government as much as the incidents in the hinterland do. Consequently, it has been focusing more on the mainland, taking on targets like urban areas, economic centres, and religious places. Till 2001, terrorist activities by Pakistan-sponsored Islamic groups were almost non-existent in the mainland (except the 1993 Mumbai blasts following the demolition of Babri Mosque). But casualties outside J&K have increased significantly since that period with 1,023 killed and over 4,000 injured in nearly 60 terrorist attacks.

Moreover, with the declining role of Kashmiri militant outfits following the 1996 assembly elections, the ISI has been largely banking on Pakistani Jihadi groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Harkat ul-Ansar and Jaish-

e-Mohammad to bleed India. These terrorist groups did not enjoy tactical advantage and people's support in Kashmir as much as the Kashmiri groups did and hence, were more effectively deployed in the hinterland that provided vast areas to operate with relatively lesser pressure of security agencies.

Thirdly, after September 11, 2001, Pakistan came under heavy international pressure and had to use their terrorist assets more circumspectly to ensure higher deniability. As operating through third-country bases like Bangladesh, Nepal and the Middle East would provide no direct evidence of Pak involvement and reduce the pressure on the country, ISI had exercised this option. As a result, local surrogate

outfits like Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami, with whom the ISI had enjoyed a long association, came on the scene. Even within India, the ISI managed to convert SIMI from a radical Muslim youth organisation to a terrorist outfit by training a section of its cadres, financing and indoctrinating them, and developing their linkage with terrorist *tanzims* in Pakistan and Bangladesh. For these non-Pakistan based groups, it was relatively easier to operate in India's hinterland than in the J&K. The deteriorating internal situation in Pakistan leading to declining support for militancy in J&K was another contributing factor.

It needs to be emphasised that the decline in terrorist incidents in J&K

notwithstanding, Pakistan's strategic intentions on Kashmir remain unchanged. The India-specific terrorist infrastructure remains intact and Pakistan army's fight against domestic and anti-West Islamic groups is part of an entirely different transaction and a source of little comfort to India. The India-specific groups should be seen more as intelligence resource of Pakistan operating under Islamic cover. Occasional tactical readjustments in location, size, and organisation of training camps and infrastructure as so-called counter-terrorist initiatives are a mere eyewash to hoodwink India and the international opinion. General Officer Commanding-in-Chief (GOC-in-C), Northern Command, informed the media on January 15, 2009, "A number of the terrorist training camps are still active in Pakistan." Pakistan's Islamists reserves like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hizbul Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami and Jaish-e-Mohammad continue to receive Pak intelligence patronage in one form or the other as they actively plan to target India.

Pretension of peace notwithstanding, Pakistan's provocative firing along the Line of Control (LoC) has continued unabated during 2008 and 2009. It is mostly meant to facilitate border-crossing by terrorist groups as the firing is bound to divert the attention of the Indian troops deployed along the borders. The strategy is crystal clear, though. Forcing the Indian troops to focus on the firing rather than the routine border patrolling provides ample opportunities to the terrorists to cross over. Defence Minister A.K. Antony had highlighted the precarious situation and informed the Parliament on October 20, 2008, "Pakistan had violated the five-year

old pact on ceasefire 58 times since the ceasefire agreement came into effect from November, 2003. And since January 2008, Indian position on the LoC had been fired upon 34 times, while the total ceasefire violations by Pakistan had occurred on 58 counts. The year 2008-2009 also witnessed intensified infiltration bids."

The 'N' factor rules

Another new factor that has compounded the complexity of the Kashmir issue is the nuclearisation of Pakistan. It is considered to be a strategic asset that immunises Pakistan against any military retaliation by India, giving the country free space to indulge in anti-Indian activities like terrorism, sabotage, subversion, espionage and other internationally unacceptable activities. Pakistan also feels that its nuclear possessions sufficiently hedge it against the world, allowing it to become a failed state and sustaining it politically and economically in spite of its follies. What's more, Pakistan both subtly and blatantly capitalises on the global fears that its nuclear assets may fall into the hands of Islamic radicals and pose dire threats to global security. In short, it makes good use of the intimidating 'N-factor' and hopes to force the world not only to keep it politically and economically viable but also allow it space to tackle Kashmir issue on its terms.

Pakistan's recent effort to proliferate its nuclear arsenal, when it was embroiled in serious internal turmoil but faced no external threat, was part of this hedging exercise. The West's fears of the worst make them lower their strategic sites and remain content with whatever little Pakistan

delivers and at whatever costs to safeguard their security interests. For the West, even undermining India's legitimate security concerns is an affordable cost. The doctrine that resolution of conflict in Kashmir with some concessions given to Pakistan will de-radicalise Pakistan and isolate the terrorist groups, although completely untenable, has some takers in the West. India has not been able to demolish this precarious myth.

Current Pak strategy: Bleed-talk-bleed

The changing diplomatic setting at the bilateral level is another important factor having a bearing on the Kashmir issue. India's handling of Pakistan at the bilateral level has left much to be desired. Pakistan has almost succeeded in restarting the dialogue process with India after profusely bleeding it during the 26/11 Mumbai carnage—thus getting away without paying the attendant cost of a most reprehensible act of international terrorism. Covert Actions (CAs) come with a price tag, although with a difference—it is act now, pay later. The cost to be paid is determined by the aggrieved party's capacity and will to punish the delinquent nation on one hand, and its diplomatic skills and capability to isolate and pressurise it internationally, on the other. Through terrorist depredations, Pakistan conveys the extent of damage that it can inflict on India for retaining Kashmir. And having done so, it tries to minimise the retaliatory cost to itself by denouncing the act of terror, swearing to fight the menace together and urging to continue with the dialogue process to which Kashmir is central.



The Hurriyat was effectively commandeered by Pakistan and given global publicity, although the party had no substantial mass support. India, too, put the stamp of legitimacy and status that it did not deserve by initiating dialogue with its leaders at highest political levels.

Propounding the root cause theory, Pakistan asserts that not much can be achieved in tackling terror till the root cause, i.e. Kashmir, is resolved amicably. But for such messages to have an impact, persistent, repeated talks must go hand in hand with preparations for the next attack. As Pakistan lacks military capabilities to achieve its strategic objectives, it takes recourse to the bleed-talk-bleed mode which it is not likely to abandon. As per its calculations, after voicing empty threats—meant more for domestic consumption than being a part of any well-considered national strategy, India will dither, blink and talk.

While preparing for future attacks, Pakistan uses the time allowed by the peace process to hoodwink international opinion, portraying itself as a terror victim instead of a terrorist-sponsoring state and simultaneously redoubling its efforts to internationalise the Kashmir issue and thus raise the hopes of secessionists. This strategy enables Pakistan to achieve its

objective of bringing Kashmir to international focus, projecting it as the root cause radicalising Pakistan and thus catalysing international terrorism. Musharraf's assertion in his autobiography that he "would like to state emphatically that whatever movement has taken place so far in the direction of finding a solution to Kashmir is due considerably to the Kargil conflict" is indicative of this mindset.

Kargil was seen by Pakistani strategists not as a military debacle but as a success vis-à-vis its policy objective in Kashmir. Mumbai may be acclaimed by someone some day as a policy success as it enabled Pakistan to accuse India of a terrorist-sponsoring state and India agreeing to have a bilateral talk on the subject. Opening of this discourse weakens India's argument on Kashmir and its accusation that Pakistan is branding exported terrorism as an indigenous freedom movement. If Pakistan genuinely wants to withdraw support to terrorist groups, it needs no joint acceptance through talks. Talks are needed only when Pakistan wants to link it to the resolution of Kashmir dispute and it is wrong for India to fall in this trap. India's consent to talk also helps Pakistan regain its eroded legitimacy even after repeated acts of terror.

The siege within

The other important dimension of the vexed Kashmir problem relates to its internal politics, governance and handling of the civil society. Derailing the constitutional, democratic process in J&K has been central to Pakistan's Kashmir policy. In fact, derailing the democratic process and destabilising elected governments are necessary to exercise a strategic calculus of projecting externally

sponsored terrorism as a people-initiated, popular freedom movement.



Pakistan wanted both indigenous and Pak terror groups to terrorise political leaders, parties and voters through violence; intimidate the free press; stun to silence the common man and orchestrate the cumulative effect to be seen as people's rejection of Indian Constitution and democracy. The All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) was raised by Pakistan to articulate this distorted political version through its representatives in the USA, UK, Brussels and the Middle East. The Hurriyat was effectively commandeered by Pakistan and given global publicity, although the party had no substantial mass support. India, too, put the stamp of legitimacy and status that it did not deserve by initiating dialogue with its leaders at highest political levels.

The APHC partially succeeded in its strategy in the early years of militancy. But the successful polls held in October, 1996, turned out to be its undoing. In spite of terrorist violence, threats and intimidations to disrupt the poll process, the democratic process had continued since 1996, demolishing the Pak propaganda that J&K was witnessing a violent freedom movement that India was trying to suppress through oppressive military means. The State Assembly elections in 1996, 2002 and 2008, and the Parliamentary elections in 1998, 1999, 2004 and 2009 witnessed a sizeable voter turnout ranging up to 62 per cent (2008 Assembly elections). The successful outcome of the polls had surely vindicated India's position, both internally and externally. The 2008 Assembly elections were particularly significant in strengthening the democratic process within the state. A record number of 1,353 candidates contested for 87 constituencies as against 709 in 2002 and 547 in 1996. Around 4,277 political meetings were held by various parties including 2,281 in the troubled valley and 1,996 in Jammu. The voter turnout averaged around 63 per cent as compared to 43.6 per cent in 2002.

Kashmir is a real test of India's comprehensive State power and ability to exercise it. If despite its size, economic strength, military capabilities, technological advancement and international clout, it is unable to protect its legitimate interests against a small, delinquent, failing state, it will reflect too poorly on the capabilities and visions of those who are at helm of affairs. History may judge them too harshly! **DSA**

The writer is a highly rated expert on terrorism, counter-intelligence, and operations. He is also a noted strategic analysis and writer.





the other side **REVEALED**

Once again, India and China have tried to bury the hatchet and started talks to resolve the long-simmering border dispute. But the roots of conflict run deep and even a political visionary like Jawaharlal Nehru had little faith in China's policies towards India. Although known as a champion of peace and neutrality, the initiator of the Panchsheel Accord had voiced his concerns long before the 1962 war. But other strategic and ideological compulsions shaped the state of Indo-Sino ties...



Ashok Parthasarathi

Even today China poses a serious political, military, territorial and economic threat to India, almost as serious as it did before the 1962 war. However, misconceptions still exist when it comes to the history of our bilateral relationship. Balbir Punj, for one, wrote that Jawaharlal Nehru had a "thesis" that China "having thrown off colonialism, would not have territorial ambitions." But that assessment is most unfair to Nehru. I can say this on the basis of Nehru's final instructions on March 18, 1958, to my father G. Parthasarathi, who was leaving for Beijing (then Peking) the next day as India's ambassador to China.

To quote from my father's diary on March 18, 1958 "I went to see Panditji at Teen Murti at 11 pm for my final and most important briefing. As I sat down opposite him at his huge and beautiful desk, Panditji said 'So G.P., when has the foreign office told you *Hindi Chini bhai-bhai* Don't you believe it. I don't trust the Chinese one bit,

despite Panchsheel and all that. The Chinese are arrogant, devious, hypocritical and thoroughly unreliable. In fact, they have deliberately chosen to be anti-Indian. our brief from me, therefore, is to be extremely vigilant about all Chinese intentions, policies and actions towards us. All your telegrams should be marked 'Top Secret' and sent to me alone. ou should be especially careful to see that Krishna (Menon) does not see your telegrams. ou should also be very careful in your meetings and discussions with Krishna. All three of us share a common world view, but Krishna allows his thinking and assessments to be clouded on the matter of our relations with China merely because China is a Communist country."

There is a long background to Nehru's viewpoint. It goes back to his deep commitment to our country pursuing an independent foreign policy on the one hand, and maximising our efforts to befriend China on the other - not because it is a Communist country, but because we

share a border of more than 4,500 km with it. And the first aspect led him to reject Western offers - not merely overtures - to build up our defence forces through arms supply, training and much more.

Why Nehru turned down the US N-power offer

Two little-known incidents may be mentioned here. In the summer of 1949, Dean Acheson, the then US Secretary of State, sent Deputy Secretary, Frank Norman to Nehru with an offer. It was stated that the



Zhou Enlai

“ So G.P., when has the foreign office told you *Hindi Chini bhai-bhai*? Don't you believe it. I don't trust the Chinese one bit, despite Panchsheel and all that. The Chinese are arrogant, devious, hypocritical and thoroughly unreliable. ”

Jawaharlal Nehru

USA was extremely concerned at the emergence of Communist China and felt that it would be in the security interest of both the USA and India if the US were to arm, build up and train all three Indian defence services.

Nehru, instead of reacting to Norman's proposal, turned to the father of our nuclear programme, Homi Jehangir Bhabha, who was the only Indian Nehru had specially invited to the meeting with Norman and asked him "Homi, how long will you take to explode our first atomic bomb?" Bhabha replied "In three years, Sir." With that, the meeting with Norman ended. Nehru's message to the USA was clear.

Later, in mid-1961, when the intelligence agencies of the US government came to the assessment that Red China would undertake its first nuclear test in mid-1963, President John F. Kennedy directed the then US ambassador to India and a close friend of Nehru, John Kenneth Galbraith, to specially call on Nehru and convey the following message from Kennedy The USA has estimated the likely



The Panchsheel Principles, 1954

- Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty
- Mutual non-aggression
- Mutual non-interference in internal affairs
- Equal and mutual benefit working relationship
- Peaceful co-existence

timing of the Chinese test and it is crucial for the USA and the rest of the free world that the first Asian power to undertake a nuclear test should be democratic India and not Communist China. Towards that end, the USA is ready to immediately send a team of high-level nuclear weapon scientists to India along with the complete design and drawings to make an atom bomb and all the materials and components needed to make such a bomb.

Nehru pondered over the remarkable and exceptional offer for several days. He also had long discussions with Bhabha regarding this matter. He then came to the conclusion that India could not accept the US offer, unprecedented though it was. The following factors led him to take such a decision.

First of all, accepting Kennedy's offer would have totally compromised the stand

on nuclear weapons that India had taken right from the time when the USA dropped the first two bombs on Japan in August, 1945. This was steadfast and uncompromising opposition to nuclear weapons of all kinds—including the campaign against nuclear testing in all forms and in all environments.

Secondly, attempting to pre-empt or score over China in the first nuclear weapons test for eight countries did not appeal to Nehru. This would lead to the chain of events which Nehru had been desperately trying to avoid - a political conflict and military arms race with China. It would not only be wasteful and pointless, but more importantly, would lead to the diversion of every scarce resource - human, physical and financial-away from poor India's central concern, the socio-economic development.

Finally, it would also fundamentally compromise India's commitment to an independent foreign policy.

So Nehru sent for Galbraith and asked him to convey to Kennedy his inability to accept the remarkable US offer. On July 28, 1961, Nehru also wrote a long letter to Kennedy explaining India's position.

Sino-Indo ties: Where do we stand?

Little has changed in China's continuous perfidy and deep-seated enmity towards India or in our government's afraid-to-annoy-China stance. The present government has repeatedly shown its willingness to live with compromised national self-respect. But we need to stand up to China and respond to their bullying. This even applies to the role and functioning of the Dalai Lama, whether here at home or abroad, or the repeated border incursions. This also includes our rejection of what the new, young Chinese Foreign Minister told our External Affairs Minister in the course of their meeting in Hamburg last year—the mere presence of settled populations along the border does not mean that China will give up its territorial claims. This was in direct contravention of the border settlement signed by Dr. Manmohan Singh and Wen Jiabao in April 2005.

Then there are the nefarious measures China is taking to set up a string of China Study Centres in Nepal all along the Indo-Nepal border. Also, the Chinese plan to link Kathmandu to the Karakoram Highway via a new 800 km road into Nepal does not augur well for India. So the infrastructure expansion planned by our government regarding airports and roadways in the eastern sector should be taken up on a war footing. They are vital for deterrence of more serious military initiatives by China along the border.

The list of threats can go on and on, from both military and cultural points of view. et, the Manmohan Singh government not only keeps talking about a "strategic partnership" with China, but also undertakes military exercises with that country. The warning about China's enmity towards us and, consequently of a possible repeat of 1962, is both necessary and timely. **DSA**

The writer was a Science Adviser to late Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi.

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
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war-torn afghanistan:

Even after eight years of US-led military action and billions of pounds in aid, the country thrives as a safe haven for Islamic radicals bent on propagating terror and destruction. Threatened by a virulent Taliban insurgency in which thousands have died, should USA and its global allies reconsider war and non-war strategies for the success of Mission Afghanistan?

Battlefield Afghanistan— then and now

The war-ravaged Afghanistan has a troubled past and a look back into the country's history may help make sense of the Afghan quagmire. In the 19th century, British rulers of India imposed imperial control over Afghanistan by planting or supporting pliant rulers and keeping a wary eye on rebellious warlords. In fact, "punitive expeditions" were frequently mounted against tribal leaders who revolted against those propped-up rulers. Dubbed as butcher-and-bolt operations, crops and villages were burnt down during those expeditions and human rights were practically unheard of. The young Winston Churchill served with the Malakand Field Force, which undertook many such operations in Pashtun areas (now in Pakistan).¹ Today, the Afghan rebel leaders are up in arms against a regime strongly supported by the USA.

"Our goal has never been to dominate Afghanistan but, rather, to eliminate Al-Qaeda's haven and empower Afghans to govern their country in line with their best interests and our national security," John Kerry, head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said.²

However, the statement seems to disguise a raw demand for American dominance as the global superpower reserves its right over crucial decisions on the pretext of "national security". Britain's

peace is still a far Cry...



Defence Secretary, John Reid speaks the same language when he says, "We are in the south to help and protect the Afghan people (as they) construct their own democracy."³

It is, therefore, important to find out whether the USA and its allies are as deadly focused on the war on terror as they claim to be. Take a look at the first speech of President Obama that has focused on defeating Al-Qaeda and his determination to do so.

"So I want the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to

either country in the future. That's the goal that must be achieved. That is a cause that could not be more just. And to the terrorists who oppose us, my message is the same: We will defeat you.

"To achieve our goals, we need a stronger, smarter, and comprehensive strategy. To focus on the greatest threat to our people, America must no longer deny resources to Afghanistan because of the war in Iraq. To enhance the military, governance, and economic capacity of Afghanistan and Pakistan, we have to marshal international support."

President Obama and his advisers are, however, groping for solutions. But it is not yet clear what exactly the USA wants to

achieve in Afghanistan and how. On June 8, US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates ordered the new US military commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, and his deputy, Lt. Gen. David Rodriguez, to submit a review of the US strategy within 60 days of their arrival in Afghanistan. The US National Security Council, the Central Command and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had pondered over the country's Afghan strategy. And civilian departments had already carried out a separate review. On March 27, shortly after those reviews were completed, the administration announced a strategy for defeating Al-Qaeda, reducing civilian casualties and eliminating the terrorist haven.⁴

Time to change frontline strategies?

But the enemy of the US-NATO forces cannot be identified so easily. In fact, members of those shadowy sub-national groups often resemble the common people of Afghanistan and are extremely difficult to track down.

Southern Afghanistan is the main base of Taliban-led insurgency which had left some 6,400 people dead in 2008. The attacks on the US, NATO and Afghan troops have lately become more lethal, thanks to the deadly impact of continued

Transforming Afghanistan into a peaceful, flourishing democracy is fast becoming a distant dream. Expectations are considerably downsized when Obama laid out his new strategy and made it clear that the mark of success would be the ability "to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to prevent their return to either country in the future."

bomb blasts and suicide attacks. In other words, the enemy has become bolder and more innovative every day. A self-declared religious fanatic, he does not seem to fear death like others and intends to achieve martyrdom. The Taliban not only aims to defeat the enemy but also fights for the ideals and values it represents.

The war in Afghanistan continues to rage without any sign of abatement. It is because the USA and its allies have not been able to find a winning formula against an enemy who does not fear death. Their enemy can command overwhelming public support and is capable of churning out hundreds of suicide bombers. Moreover, we have come a long way from those days when set-piece battles used to settle a conflict. Winning set-piece battles, however intense, is of little consequence in fourth-generation warfare and the allies must ensure a comprehensive strategy to weed out the resurgent Taliban.

To defeat the Taliban, US-led forces must adopt innovative operational techniques and tactics suited to fight a fourth-generation war. The US and NATO forces require a quantum jump in force multipliers to come to grips with the new challenges they face in Afghanistan. Fighting against the not-so-regular forces is particularly difficult there as the enemy is operating from populated areas and is not easily distinguishable from a civilian.

Moreover, it has support and shelter in neighbouring Pakistan. Although the US administration is developing specific strategies for conducting war in Afghanistan-Pakistan theatres, a decisive victory may still prove to be elusive as cross-border bases, difficult terrain and harsh weather conditions severely restrict the options of coalition forces.

The Pentagon has provided McChrystal as many as 400 officers and others as a brain trust devoted to Afghanistan and the related problem of instability and porous borders in Pakistan. Gen. McChrystal's decision to set up a Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell means creating a corps of roughly 400 officers who will spend years focused on Afghanistan, shuttling in and out of the country and working on those issues even while they are stateside.⁵

During the first five months of 2009, there has been a 59 per cent increase in insurgent attacks in Afghanistan, a 62 per cent increase in coalition deaths and a 64 per cent increase in the use of improvised explosive devices compared to the same period last year. It seems to have reached the peak so far in the eight-year war, according to the US Defence Department statistics. Unfortunately, about 11,000 more US troops who have recently landed in Afghanistan to combat the Taliban seem to have made little difference.⁶

During a speech at the Washington Think-tank Center for a New American Security, Gen. David Petraeus, head of the US Central Command, said that the number of attacks in Afghanistan over the last week had hit the highest level since the fall of the Taliban in December 2001.

"Some of this will go up because we are going to go after their sanctuaries and safe havens as we must. But there is no question that the situation has deteriorated over the course of the past two years in particular and there are difficult times ahead," he said.

According to Petraeus, there were more than 400 insurgent attacks last week, including ambushes, small arms volleys, assaults on Afghan infrastructure and government offices and roadside bomb and mine explosions. In comparison, attacks in January 2004 were less than 50 per week. However, extremist attacks in the rural nation tend to increase in the summer months and, in part, are spurred by the military efforts to crack down on insurgents, he added.⁷

In his book *War of Necessity, War of Choice*, CFR (Council on Foreign Relations) president Richard N. Haass says that



President Barack Obama may be turning the Afghanistan war into a “war of choice”.

“The US goals in Afghanistan are still relatively modest. But the level of investment is getting large, the level of effort is significant. It’s more than ten times, I would say, our level of effort in Pakistan. And it does represent something of a shift from what Mr. Obama inherited.

“Since then, the US position in Afghanistan has gotten broader, and in the most recent Obama administration white paper, you have the President and others talking about bringing the fight to the Taliban. So this suggests to me more than a narrow goal of simply going after Al-Qaeda remnants and a larger goal of essentially trying to help the central government in Kabul prevail in what increasingly looks like a civil war.

“I believe that what they are now doing goes beyond a narrow or minimalist policy of simply targeting Al-Qaeda. They appear to have a broader effort under way to essentially neutralize or weaken or defeat the Taliban. And the reason I would say that constitutes something of a war of choice is that one could have a narrower policy of simply going after Al-Qaeda. The use of military force in pursuit of this larger goal also reflects elements of choice. One could emphasise other tools of foreign policy, be it diplomacy or development.”⁸

New offensive, bitter struggle

“The situation in Afghanistan indicates that

the Taliban are gaining ground as their strategy has, so far, been superior to that of the US-NATO forces. The insurgency by Taliban forces is now being conducted with the strategic aim of overwhelming surrounding areas of Kabul and eventually linking up with Pakistani Taliban who provide men, material and moral support and thus enable them to continue their fight against much superior forces.

“A major argument of the US administration for sending more troops south and east has been that most of the fighting is taking place here. The US strategy to secure these areas with additional troops aims to put greater pressure on the Taliban progressively and split their cadres. Induction of additional troops is, however, unlikely to achieve these

aims till the social and political base of the Taliban remains intact. Unless grass-roots support for the Taliban is eliminated, coalition forces will never find enough troops to secure vital areas.”⁹

Robert Naiman, an Afghanistan expert, notes It is widely recognised that sending more people—whether soldiers or civilians—is very unlikely in itself to change anything fundamental because the order of magnitude is wrong. The United States has not been, is not, and almost certainly never will be willing and able to commit the resources, which would be necessary to transform Afghanistan into a peaceful “democracy” according to the present policy. The most that could be plausibly hoped for is that additional resources would help make a new policy work a new

US President Barack Obama might have turned the Afghan war into a “war of choice”. But does he have the time and resources to go beyond mere military goals and build hope through development and good governance?



policy based on a fundamental, political shift in the US policy, including accommodation with the bulk of the political forces now backing Afghanistan’s various insurgencies.”¹⁰


According to recent media reports, an attack on the main US base in Afghanistan killed two soldiers of the NATO-led force on June 21, a rare instance of casualties caused by hostile fire on a military base. At least six other soldiers were reported wounded in an attack on Bagram airfield which is situated about 50 km north of Kabul and serves as the main base of operations for nearly 57,000 US troops.¹¹

So the Afghan war has essentially become an existential struggle for the Taliban. And they are desperate to achieve a sustainable victory. The prevailing anti-American sentiments are likely to grow with additional troops on the ground. But even such nationalist sentiments are unlikely to force the Taliban into submission, or put Al-Qaeda under unbearable pressure so long as large segments of people on both sides of the Durand Line continue to lend support to the Taliban. In other words, peace cannot prevail in war-torn Afghanistan unless we look beyond the narrow bindings of military operations and start addressing the multi-layered fabric of life that forms the core of the nation and its people. **USA**

The writer is a well known retired Indian Army general and a military scholar who has authored several books on strategic affairs & military studies. He is a graduate of the Defense Services Staff College, Wellington and the National Defence College.

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Rear Admiral
Raja Menon (Retd.)

It is daunting to feel an opinion contrary to that of the Public when that feeling seems to unite them, or to be out of phase with the pack when they are off baying in the wrong direction. But this is not an unusual experience for an analyst. The public is appalled that Hafiz Saeed, founder of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), has been released from Pakistani custody. This writer holds an altogether different opinion, the reasons for which need some explanation.

Saeed set up shop in Kunar, Afghanistan, in the early nineties to train terrorists to kill Indians in Kashmir. He then ran the smallest but best-trained outfit. Of all organisations funnelling terrorists into the valley, the most vicious was undoubtedly the LeT. Saeed was the first to realise the need to change the pattern of recruitment into the *tanzeems* from Kashmiris to Afghans, Punjabis and Mirpuris, after the purely Kashmiri-manned insurgency had run out of steam by 1995. It was the same year when Osama fled Sudan and took up residence in Peshawar, and Kashmir became a part of the Pan-Islamic offensive. Jihadis began to collect from all parts of the world.

LeT seemed to have an endless supply of Afghans, Chechens, Jordanians, Arabs and Algerians. Not surprisingly, many writers including this author wrote about how this individual, waging war on India, woke up in the morning in his home in Muridke (recently shifted), had breakfast, collected his briefcase and went to work, with complete impunity to wage war on India, just like another day at the office. It seemed incredible that the thousands of crores that New Delhi spent on intelligence agencies and myriad advanced technologies could not eliminate him in eight years.

The scene now shifts to the post-World Trade Center Afghanistan. Musharraf had promised to help wage war on the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, but he had retained all the anti-India Jihadi groups, now under different names, on a long leash. As the head of the international Lashkar-e-

PLANNING HAFIZ SAEED'S FUTURE

Two decades of terrorism has cost India thousands of lives which no single war would have claimed. Yet, we do nothing more than making futile statements—requesting that “stern action” be taken against terror masterminds like Hafiz Saeed. Under the current situation, how should we fight jihadi terrorism? And what are the chinks in the armour of India's anti-terror management? A close look at realities that repel...

Taiba, Hafiz was Pakistan's insurance that when the Americans would leave Afghanistan and Islamabad would have to face India, the LeT would be the great leveller. But Saeed had other ideas. He launched the attack on the Indian Parliament in co-ordination with Masood Azhar and the ISI, and the two countries were on the verge of war.

Hafiz Saeed was into strategy, having graduated from tactics, and he had tutors from the retired ISI masters. War was the last thing that Musharraf wanted when his western border was up in flames. But Saeed realised that war with India would unite all religious fundamentalists (fundos), the ISI, the Pakistani Army and the disbelieving public into defending Pakistan against India. The war in Afghanistan would be

befall him. Are prisoners like Saeed made to break stones for the Pakistani PWD? People like Masood Azhar and Hafiz Saeed run big addas where they live, guarded by dozens of thugs. Only in the background lurks the ISI to ward off newshounds, international journalists and Indian TV anchors, on the lookout to interview the head thug.

What India should want is to have Saeed in a safe location like the Agra Fort. We can then get the story of the nexus between Saeed and Osama, Saeed and Beitullah, Saeed and the ISI, Saeed and Masood Azhar, and send copies to the State Department, the Pentagon and thousands of copies to Pakistan. What difference does it make to Saeed's life if he is protected by the ISI in Muridke or in

latter can write letters and non-papers, requesting action by Islamabad.

For years now, many analysts have been suggesting that India can ill afford to engage 17,000 special force personnel / commandos (10,000 army men and 7000 National Security Guards), the second largest number in the world, if they are only utilised for backing up the infantry and protecting some really venal politicians.

If special forces are to be used to resolve the nation's problems, and not just the army commander's, they need to be placed under a Special Operations Command, with an integral air component, intelligence, model makers, simulation specialists, linguists and photo-analysts. The prime minister can retain the authority to finally decide whether to launch a clandestine attack or not, but it makes no sense for the nation NOT to prepare to eliminate those who have waged war on India for 17 years and managed to get away with it.

The greatest tragedy is that the armed forces themselves do not speak with one voice. A bona fide and dedicated Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) seems to be a far cry after the previous army chief reversed the army's 30-year-old support for a CDS. The Ministry of Defence is nothing more than an obstacle race for the armed forces in their acquisition plans as no sensible policy has ever emerged from the Ministry.

It was also hoped that a national security agency (NSA) would cater to the nation and override turf interests. But that has not happened so far. What's more, all components of a Special Operations Command already exist and it only requires an Executive order to set it up formally. But who will give that order? By now, it should have been easier to nab terrorists like Dawood Ibrahim who often travel to Dubai. But our approach to fighting external terrorism has been almost Brahmanical, if not comical. We will request the USA to declare the LeT, a terrorist outfit; we will request the USA not to give aid to Pakistan; we will request the Pakistanis to keep Hafiz Saeed in jail; but we will do nothing ourselves. If this is a generational problem, it is time for the present lot to quit and hand over the mantle before it is too late. **USA**

The writer was a career officer and a submarine specialist in the Navy and retired in 1994 as the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Operations). He has also served as a Chairman of the Task Force on Net Assessment and Simulation in the National Security Council, and is a distinguished fellow in the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies and the National Maritime Foundation.



forgotten, the coalition would be rejected, Afghanistan would be re-talibanised and Pakistan would get its strategic space. But between Muridke and Rawalpindi the only strategy that can be cobbled together is a bizarre, crackpot version by people whose worldview is one where they barely know which country lies to the west of Turkey.

Six years later, Saeed's organisation makes another attempt in Mumbai and the strategic objective is the same as in 2002—to get India enraged with Pakistan so that a conventional war is launched while the "fundos" and the Army are united with the Pakistani State against the marauding India. By now, Hafiz Saeed has been at it for 15 years, has a tyre around his middle and has promoted himself to Chairman Emeritus of the Lashkar. That is the only reason why Saeed may not try a third time what he failed to achieve in 2002 and 2008.

So this is the man who, according to Indians, should be put in Pakistani State custody. But is it the worst fate that can

Attock Fort. But it makes a lot of difference to us, because in Attock it is not possible that he will disappear to reappear in Agra. And this is the reason why we want Saeed roaming freely in Pakistan.

Vajpayee's refusal to launch an offensive against Pakistan after the Parliament attack, in accordance with the recommendations of the army chief in 2002, made it clear that all-out war was a poor option for an Indian prime minister leading a country growing at nine per cent. Moreover, with Pakistan under attack in the West due to Taliban activities and attempts by the fundamentalists to reunite the army with the jihadists by inviting an Indian to attack in the East, it is now more than clear that using conventional force against Pakistan must be avoided, until it ceases to have the opposite effect of what is desired. So what do States do in such circumstances? Do they only ask the Armed Forces to sit on their hands and hand over all policy-making to diplomats, so that the

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
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Maoist Apparatus & BRIDGING THE OLD FAULT LINES



Maloy Krishna Dhar

The Terror tentacles are spreading fast; fierce gun battles are raging in the depths of rural India and well-planned ambushes are claiming lives everyday. The current scenario is grim, to say the least, as the Naxalites have flexed their muscles and intensified their attacks across the country over the past few months. To top it all, a spokesperson has recently threatened to resort to LTTE-style attacks against Congress President Sonia Gandhi and Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh. A threat has also been issued against Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram while all Congress legislators have been told to quit or face “death warrants”.

The Maoist movement is certainly undergoing an evolution of sorts. From their somewhat insignificant presence and lukewarm acceptance in the so-called politically enlightened urban pockets, they have gained a populist stature and become broad-based in a more meaningful manner. Their new-found voice of confidence is certainly not a part of the usual publicity gimmick but speaks of a long-term vision and well-coordinated action plans. It may, therefore, help us to gain new insights into the making and functioning of the Maoist movement as it continues to impact the country.

The rise and rise of a militant voice



The present-day Maoist movement has metastasised due to chronic neglect by the State and emerged as a series of wars against the State, believed to be established by a Constitution and conducting the affairs of the nation on the basis and sanctions of certain acts, laws and systemic logistics.

But unlike the popular belief, the Maoist agenda has not sprung from Charu Mazumdar's Naxalbari movement initiated in 1967. It has a long history spanning India's agrarian unrest and the consequent uprising of the deprived and exploited rural populace grinded under the millstone of feudal bosses, moneylenders, political exploiters and plunderers of the national exchequer. Overlooked by the country's majority, such agitations often assumed

violent manifestations which were then dealt with an iron hand.

In course of time, those movements have been stamped as the culmination of one revolutionary theory or the other. But initially, the Ho, Munda, Kol or Santhal uprising did not receive such stamps, as no specific cut-and-dried political concept existed at that point of time. For the ruling classes, it was simply an audacious rebellion by the tribal people against the British authority. Such a tag, however, is undoubtedly incorrect. Those were, indeed, the classic uprisings of the adivasis hailing from Bengal, Bihar and Chhotanagpur region. Although they rose against exploitation and economic deprivation, the British rulers managed to suppress them, thanks to the efforts of the armed forces and the active backing rendered by Hindu and Muslim zamindars. But history lives on, and the names of Sido-Kanhu and Birsa Munda have become immortal in the folklores of the tribal people now inhabiting parts of Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand and Orissa.

The Sanyasi Revolution in Bengal and parts of Bihar against degraded Muslim rulers and corrupt officials of the East India Company started after the devastating famine of 1770. The event was immortalised by Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay in his epic novels, *Devi Chaudhurani* and *Anandamath*. These were the strings of the combined agrarian uprising of the rural proletariat in which Hindu sanyasis and Muslim faqirs, as well as the agrarian folks, had taken part. And the religious tag assigned to the movement finally motivated Bankim Chandra to sing the immortal song of patriotism *Vande Mataram*.

The agrarian uprising in 19th century Bengal under Titu Mir and the Faraizi group were stamped as the Wahhabi uprising against the British and the majority of Hindu landholders. The movement had affected parts of Bihar as well.

The Indigo Revolt in Bengal and Bihar was also essentially an agrarian movement against the forced cultivation of Indigo by the British planters. The event was immortalised in *Neel Darpan*, a play by Dinabandhu Mitra that stirred up the national conscience and significantly paved the way for the rise of Indian Nationalism.

The Telangana agrarian revolt and armed struggle, initially against the oppressive regime of the *Nizam* and later against the independent government of India, and the Tebhaga Andolan of Bengal (1946) were spearheaded by the Communist Party of India. My father had also fought alongside legendary figures like Ila Mitra against the unjustified agrarian policy of the British. These historic movements took place at times when India was in the throes of independence movement and the certainty of partition was looming large. The Communists of the day were inspired by the Russian Revolution that was built around urban workers and not the peasantry. Nonetheless, these uprisings had been given the stamp of Communist Revolutionary Movement of the agrarian folks.

Besides these movements, there were several agrarian uprisings in the former Madras territory and in certain parts of Travancore. The Moplah rebellion in Kerala, although started as an agrarian movement and a movement opposing British policy against the *Khalifa* of Turkey, had degenerated into a communal holocaust proving inexorably that any socio-economic movement conducted in the name of religion was bound to degenerate into communal carnage, especially in a pluralistic society where tolerance is the first victim.

Charu Mazumdar—The new voice of dissent

When Charu Mazumdar conceived the armed uprising of the agrarian proletariat he had very little idea of organisational planning, military expertise and the sustaining capability of the movement. He had no command structure except for some fringe mobilisation done by Jangal Santhal, Kanu Sanyal and Khokan Majumdar. Charu was a theorist and not an expert field commander. He was inspired by the Maoist ideology and believed that its application in a rural pocket would give rise to spontaneous uprising across the country.

Charu was an angry man, very impatient and was limited by the tunnel vision of a leader who believed that his vision

would ensure the ultimate road map for the emancipation of the proletariat of India (ours truly had the good fortune of interacting with some pioneers of the Naxalbari Movement in 1965-67 and was aware of his stand).

Charu's movement came to be stamped as a Maoist Movement. China supported it through electronic and print propaganda, and termed it as the 'spring thunder' of Maoist revolution in India. Charu's successors, now presumably fighting the agrarian guerrilla warfare with much more sophisticated weapons and organised command structure, are also described in generic terms of Naxals and Maoists. But this dissertation is not the proper forum to examine how much of Maoism is involved in the present phase of the movement and how much it is conditioned by other issues. In short, we have a vast, sophisticated, agrarian, rural and ideological guerrilla warfare problem that has not been properly evaluated, diagnosed and addressed. The historical legacy has now assumed threatening proportions, giving rise to the existence of a vast conflict zone in the country that has arisen from the volcanic ashes of National Fault Lines of the past.

Most people admit that Charu's experiment with Maoist methodology of upgrading the agrarian unrest with "mass elimination" of class enemies had added a new dimension to the movement. His experiments had evolved through several experimentations, though. The "mass elimination" tactic came into force in Greater Calcutta, Birbhum and Debra-Gopiballavpur (West Bengal); Mushahari block in

Muzaffarpur, Bihar; Lakhimpur-Kheri in UP; Koraput tribal area in Orissa; Shrikakulam in Andhra; Wyanad in Kerala and several places in Punjab. The uprising ultimately fizzled out in the face of resolute State action and, in places, action by organised upper caste armed forces.

Charu's "mass elimination" had temporarily inspired young students of elite colleges of Calcutta, Delhi and other places, and they had carried out the mindless bloodbath believing that it was the right prescription to fight the class enemies. China had egged on the Charu-brand revolutionaries with a view to create soft internal bellies in India during and after India's involvement in the Bangladesh Liberation War. As the urban and rural "mass elimination" programme had no definite war direction, even a seasoned Maoist killer like Asim Chatterjee (my college acquaintance) was disillusioned in the long run. He felt tired of the mass killing pogrom prescribed by Charu.

From splinter groups to a united front?

After the death of Mao edong in 1976 and the coup d'état carried out against his successors by Deng iaoping, the world Communist Movement faced a great crisis. The Maoist parties / organisations had to defend the doctrine and oppose Deng, besides countering the dogmatic attacks on Mao

launched by Enver Hoxha of Albania. With the change in the global scenario, the Indian movement was divided into many factions as well although a unification of such forces would have stood them in good stead.

Since the halcyon days of Charu's original Communist Party (ML), the movement has undergone several changes, splits, unity efforts and deregionalisation process. It has started assuming a composite character, a kind of united movement, despite the existence of splinter groups (nearly 30), organisational incompatibility and minor ideological differences.

The unity of the Maoist forces in India means uniting forces that originated from the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), Maoist Coordination Committee (India) and other similar factions. The CPI (ML) was founded under the leadership of Charu Mazumdar in 1971. But following his death in 1972, the party splintered into many pieces. One of the parties which is a direct descendant of the original CPI (ML) and continues to uphold the banners of Mazumdar and Maoism is the CPI (ML-Naxalbari). And the party has rapidly expanded its network in several states, especially in Maharashtra, Karnataka and Kerala.

Like the Maoist Coordination Committee, CPI (ML-Naxalbari) is a part of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM) and continues to work for the unity of the Maoist revolutionaries across India. RIM is intricately connected to various national and international outfits


DNA of a Conflict Zone

Key forces involved in Conflict Zone
In a given Conflict Zone (as in Maoist-affected areas) basically four groups of players are the regular constants.



Tertiary foray of other parties in the Conflict Zone

As conflict develops into a cancerous continuity, several other factors enter the arena with different objectives.



Other elements

Besides the above-mentioned elements, there are additional elements playing a key role in keeping the movement alive and kicking.



including Communist Party of Germany (German Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands—KPD), Communist Party of the Philippines, Marxist-Leninist (CPP-ML), Communist Party of Peru (Partido Comunista del Perú, more commonly known as the Sendero Luminoso or the Shining Path), Communist Party USA (CPUSA) and Purva Banglar Communist Party (Jana Juddha).

Of particular importance among other parties in this category is the CPI (ML-People's War), which has a long history of leading the masses to armed struggles. The party has strongholds in broad rural areas in Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Orissa, as well as in Bengal, Bihar and other parts of the country. The CPI (ML-PW), as well as the above-mentioned RIM parties and organisations, are members of CCOMPOSA (the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia).

Since the setbacks suffered by the Naxalbari uprising and the splintering of the Maoist forces, a united revolutionary Maoist party has been a strong desire of the Maoist ideologues. Groups like the MCC (I), CPI (ML-PW), and CPI (ML-Naxalbari) have now considerably consolidated their positions and battle-capability in several parts of West

Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Kerala, which offer almost a contiguous territory to the armed Maoists. Never before these groups had such territorial consolidation and power to exercise the mass control mechanism (MCM) along with armed struggle.

The Maoist movement has emerged as the single largest threat to India's internal security. The developments have thrown up several challenges to the State and its systemic tools, especially after the recent success of the Maoist movement in Nepal. If Nepal is taken as a part of the unbroken map, the reader would realise that there exists a daggerlike thrust into the heart of India, from Nepal to the depth of southern India, rolling down steadily to the Western Ghats.

According to Maoist forces, conditions in vast areas of rural India are just right for waging a "people's war" as criminal neglect of the rural economy for more than 60 odd years has given rise to unemployment and starvation. Benevolent government policies are there, of course, offering doles, unemployment allowances, rural employment grant etc. And such measures have ensured that at least 35 per cent of the rural populace look up to the ruling deities as gods

raining occasional manna. A class of permanent beggars are being created by those policies while there is very little effort to generate economic sinews for strengthening the bridge between the urban affluent, rural feudal and the chronically starving masses. Suicide by the farmers has also added a shameful chapter to the long saga of India's economic failure.

The Maoists consider that weakening of the Indian State, splintering of political parties, rise of caste and region-based parties and discriminatory government (scorched-earth) policies pursued in rural India offer them better opportunities to strengthen the movement and advance towards a successful armed revolution. The major ideologues also realise that without a united Maoist party, a people's army and a revolutionary united front, the full revolutionary potential of the situation in India cannot be fully realised.

Recent meetings of the major Maoist groups have stressed on this aspect of unity and combined movement against the Indian government machineries. Keeping these aspects in view, a few structural peculiarities of the Maoist movement and their operation policies are required to be understood both by the State machineries and the common people, who are the main fodder for the struggle that is now

being waged between the State and the Maoists.

The Maoist mechanism

As the situation worsens into a regular armed conflict between the Maoists and the State, the rebels start implementing "mass control mechanism". This well-researched technology of revolution has been widely chronicled by scholars of terrorism studies and conflict management sciences. In short, Maoists start with destroying the State control through propaganda and wrecking symbols of governance like schools, hospitals, tehsil offices, railway lines etc. Sudden raids on isolated police pickets and assassinations of government officials, members of elected local bodies and caste enemies further disrupt the existing government control. The Maoists try to isolate the targeted area and its people by destroying roads and bridges, blowing up buses and setting up their own defence systems.

People living in remote village clusters where there is no tangible presence of governance or developmental activities of any kind are often subjected to rampant corruption by government officials, and exploitation by the landlords and loan sharks. Gradually, the masses start looking up to the Maoists for protection, living on the hope that the changed system, as promised by the ultras, would deliver the dream world that shines afar in the glittering cities and homes of the affluent. They rapidly lose confidence in the State and its governing tools, and any coercive action implemented by the government further alienates them.

Once the "mass control mechanism" of the Maoists is in place, the mass control capabilities of the government begin to give way. The ruling entity loses out on public trust and the State is no longer considered to be the super power that can protect, feed and assure its people's advancement. When the level of erosion reaches a flashpoint, the Maoists start striking against big State targets.

From minor skirmishes, the conflict situation is made action-ready for periodical "big engagements," resulting into setting up of "liberated zones." We have witnessed this in Nepal and we seem to be in the midst of Phase II right now as Maoists implement "mass control" and carry out guerrilla operations of considerable magnitude against the State. Various phases of this classic conflict have been laid down by Mao, Che Guevara and General Giap. But now, these textbook realities are getting implemented by the Maoists in India.

Why is the 'red' storm rising?

The State has a statutory obligation to get involved. Its response is represented by the application of force (police and paramilitary actions), developmental activities and incentives to assure people that the State is capable of defeating the guerrilla forces. As the Government tries to regain lost turf and, consequently, people's loyalty, it exercises more force, not necessarily against the Maoists alone but also against suspected and innocent villagers.

In the absence of supplementing reforms spanning economy, administration and security, mere application of force by isolated police actions alienate the people even

Maoist




According to Maoist forces, conditions in vast areas of rural India are just right for waging a "people's war" as criminal neglect of the rural economy for more than 60 odd years has given rise to unemployment and starvation.

more, resulting into more erosion of the State's mass control. This is the classic concept that was exercised by Mahatma Gandhi as well, but through Satyagraha and Non-Cooperation. But even Gandhi could not restrain the Ahmedabad textile workers or the Chauri Chaura peasants from resorting to violence. Increased communal violence after he tried to control the Muslim masses through Khilafat movement testifies to the eternal revolutionary claim of Voltaire: Liberation can only be achieved through violence.

Between the Maoists and the State, there remains another element in the Conflict Zone – the "people" who are not a part of the "mass controlled areas" or who do not believe in the kind of revolution that the Maoists propagate. These people have three options – die as war zone fodder, resist the Maoists on their own (very lean chance) or resist the Maoists with the help of the State. The last option is not a new idea. It has been implemented by the British in Malaysia, by General Giap in Vietnam and by India in certain parts of the trouble-torn North East and Punjab. People's defence against the People's Party who wants change through violence is an internationally recognised war zone policy.

I have illustrated infiltration of other parties in the Conflict Zone, namely, vested interests in the form of forest contractors, timber merchants, tendu / kendu / beedi leaf contractors, investors who invest Maoist money in legal markets to generate revenue, arms suppliers, foreign supporters, caste forces, criminals and so on. The Government often tends to overlook these areas as vested interests most certainly control the political bosses. And the caste barons are especially important in this context as they continue to be vote bank assets in rural India. Moreover, our intelligence and police agencies are not proactive enough to pursue effective measures that may help track these sustenance links. As a result, Maoist control is getting bigger than ever before as more and more areas are coming under their command.



The above situation allows the Maoists to set up an elaborate political network. Over the years, major Maoist groups have built a tangible political structure, which has variables in different operational areas in the country. For a model, the following diagram should represent the basic structure (no allusion to any particular Maoist group).

Military command

The military formation of Indian Maoists is also formidable. At grass-roots, it is not organised as brigades and battalions, but contain well-coordinated, trained and ideologically brainwashed cadres and ancillary units. Induction of female soldiers and propaganda personnel adds value to the movement and allows the militants easy access to the homes and hearts of vulnerable people.

The graphics may offer the impression that the Maoists are well entrenched and they have the capability of waging prolonged war against the State with well-oriented, trained cadres and a steady flow of arms from Bangladesh and Nepal, as well as from the LTTE and the J&K militants who peddle weapons through different outfits.

It should also be taken into account that the Maoists have links with arms suppliers in Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. While the LTTE is the prime suspected carrier, it should not be forgotten that the Maoists command control of certain coastal areas in West Bengal, Orissa and Andhra Pradesh through which weapons are smuggled in. Remoteness of these areas and the lack of State monitoring have helped surge the Maoist operations without any effective restraint.

The State's intelligence apparatus is appallingly inadequate in the vast operational areas extending from Bihar to Andhra Pradesh including the most active hubs in Orissa, Jharkhand, and the remote tribal areas of Chhattisgarh. While the Government may have access to some surface information, it does not have access to hardcore operational information required to storm the Maoist hideouts. On the other hand, Maoists have strings of informers who provide advance information about troops' movement and the State's operation plans.

The State (taken as a whole) has not deployed adequate force to isolate the Maoists from the people and treat them as highly equipped guerrillas. A guerrilla force cannot be controlled by traditional forces like the police or the army. Superior commando forces trained in guerrilla warfare are required in sufficient numbers (buttressed by normal police-operational forces, of course) to overwhelm the forest-dwelling Maoist guerrillas. Many of the state governments are still lacking in special police forces trained in guerrilla warfare. Consequently, they are compelled to depend on traditional police personnel who may not have a proper understanding of how Maoists strategise and operate. Authorities try to get back into control by setting up isolated pickets without adequate speedy-response-support troops, well-equipped communication systems and fast-moving conveyance. Thanks to the vacuum in governance, lack of infrastructure and adequate training, these police pickets have lately become easy targets of Left wing extremists whose swift and sudden attack-and-kill policy never fails to strike terror and wrest the psychological initiative.

Most of the state governments lack in co-ordination and fail to comprehend that mobile guerrilla forces cannot be fought within the imaginary lines of the intricately laid state boundaries. Moreover, there is hardly any aerial surveillance or electronic monitoring mechanism to monitor the communication network of the Maoists. Therefore, in spite of a plethora of conferences, discussions and decisions, the ground position of the State continues to be fragile.

Since State response is inadequate, its equally inadequate application of force cannot break the stranglehold of Maoist mass control. Their propaganda machinery is changing fast as well. Gone are the folklores woven around tribal heroes like Sidho-Kanu or Birsu Munda. The name of Mao often replaces the glorious saga of the soil in various tribal strongholds of the Left-wing extremists. What's more, their cultural groups in towns and cities work in unison with those operating and spreading the ideological spell. And the State has little power to counteract this propaganda barrage.

Although the Government seems clueless about a possible solution to contain the Maoists, it is not too difficult to comprehend. Developmental work must start in real earnest to improve the conditions of cultivators, rural artisans, landless people and the rural unemployed. The country must do away with the anarchic rule by the big land owners, caste barons, moneylenders and forest plunderers. And the same can be achieved through administrative corrections, societal changes, containment of corruption and better economic packages for the neglected rural and tribal areas.

Revolutions in the name of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism cannot be allowed to destroy the democratic core of the country. I have personal sympathies for and connections with many Maoist leaders of past and present. But I differ when it comes to these vital areas of national concern.

We have enough worries from other sectors which threaten the integrity of the country. Threats from the Islamists, ethnic rebels and proxy-war from neighbours are yet to be contained. Maoism is the last thing that would suit the civilisation genius of the people of India. The very ideology has failed in Russia; it is failing in China and the last vestiges of Marxism and Maoism cannot survive in the form of Castroism and Indian Marxism-Maoism. Marx and Mao are great, but their political cults are dead. We are already in the midst of another confrontation—that between the energy-hungry West and the masses of Islamic countries. India is precariously perched between the two fighting giants with a huge Muslim population having sympathy for their coreligionists and hatred for the West.


Now or no time...

The first responsibility of the State is to regain the mass control from the Maoists through application of superior, targeted force. This should be accompanied by the National Repair Works (not doles to national beggars) to fill in the fault lines of last 60 odd years caused by the independent Government of India and its provincial governments. Without repairing the fault lines immediately followed by determined and superior force application, the situation cannot be retrieved. We would be hopelessly fighting half-witted games against the determined Maoists who are inching towards unity

Maoist



Although the Government seems clueless about a possible solution to contain the Maoists, it is not too difficult to comprehend. Developmental work must start in real earnest to improve the conditions of cultivators, rural artisans, landless people and the rural unemployed.





and trying to assume massive striking power following the success of the Maoist movement in Nepal.

That the Government's resolution to go for force application is half-hearted or inadequate or ill-conceived and ill-executed is illustrated by the gruesome incident at Balimela Reservoir in Orissa on May 29. The Balimela ravine area in Malkangiri district is a parrot-beak-like area of Orissa jutting into Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. A combined team including Orissa police and the specialist Greyhound force of Andhra Pradesh had gone to search the forested hills overlooking the reservoir which feeds the pipeline of the nearby Dumduma powerhouse, nearly four km away. The forces received information that the Central Military Council of the Maoists was holding a meeting in the area. The information could have been correct or might have been a decoy. The grave mistake was committed when only a water-borne security patrol was sent and no supporting territorial force was

deployed to scan the flanking hills by the water body. There was no static watch post also. The planning was faulty and the execution was half-hearted; half the policemen did not even know how to swim. The Maoist attacked and sunk the launch.

My intention is not to dig hole. The State must apply force, when it is required to apply, in adequate quantity and superior quality. The haunting problems of lack of concrete steps by the Central Government, inadequate preparations of the provincial Governments and insufficiency of cutting-edge intelligence are likely to add to the woes of the country's agonies.

Along with determined force application, the vast areas of State responsibilities towards its people have to be attended without seasonal and cynical political gimmicks. Rural India is undoubtedly alienated from the urban centres. The urban prosperity remains out of bounds for the vast rural populace and the neglected tribals are getting more disillusioned every day. Only superior

military application by the State cannot stop the Maoist upsurge. The political and the bureaucratic entities are required to be in war-preparedness to tackle the situation by adhering to determined military actions and honest socio-economic reforms. Urban India must ensure the overall growth and prosperity of rural India and *Aranyak Bharat* (forested India). Otherwise, the exclusive glitter of globalised economy would not suffice to lift the gloom.

The Maoist guerrilla warfare should not be treated at par with ethnic or regional conflicts. The ideological guerrilla warfare has earned the historic recognition of success through fault lines of the State. Let us be aware of these fault lines and employ all possible State resources to repair the gaps. **DSA**

The writer served as a senior operative in the Intelligence Bureau. After retirement, he took to authoring books and freelance journalism, and has contributed to English and Hindi newspapers and magazines.

terror in the hills:

can we purge the scourge?

Jaideep Saikia



the Dima Halim Daogah experience...

The scenic beauty of India's North-East stands in sharp contrast to the acts of terror committed by numerous insurgent groups, who rule the fragile garrisoned soil. And for the far-flung tribes living in the Hills, life is one continuous trauma as the deadly nexus of politicians-terrorists-bureaucrats threaten their very existence. An indepth look at the North-East issue...

If a comparison were to be made among National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN), United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), United National Liberation Front (UNLF) and Dima Halim Daogah (DHD), the DHD would pale before the larger, more protracted insurgencies, which have engaged North-East India's "fragile garrisoned soil." Yet, DHD (Garlosa) is a group, a faction of an organisation that had held the hills of Assam to ransom before declaring a unilateral ceasefire—caused by the capture of its leader, Jewel Garlosa in Bangaluru. But until recently, the outfit had let loose a reign of terror in the North Cachar Hills of Assam—killing, extorting, stopping developmental projects and often bringing to halt the railway lifeline that runs through the inhospitable territory.

North East: What gives rise to terror groups?

Historically, condescension for the hills of Assam has been the primary reason for the unrest. Although this attitude has manifested itself in myriad ways, of late, it has been perfected in the most conspicuous manner when it comes to holding security meetings pertaining to N.C. Hills and the other hill district, Karbi Anglong. Almost all those meetings are held in New Delhi, some in Guwahati and the really serious ones (necessitated by severe acts of violence) are hurriedly convened at and around the helipad in N.C. Hills' capital, Haflong.

It is hoped that, with a sincere minister taking charge of home affairs and an experienced new secretary in his ministry (whose performance as the Joint Secretary, North-East, about a decade ago was exemplary), at least this aspect of disdain for the periphery will disappear from Raisina Hill. The caution the Home Minister has sounded about the three states in the North-East during the Internal Security Meeting on August 17, 2009, showcases that the North Block is serious about the situation in the North-East, and is contemplating new strategies.

Strategy is a factor that needs to take into account history and external dimensions (if any), and then delve deep into the reasons that trigger off that insurgency. Almost all cases of insurgency in the North-East (some of which have transformed into full-fledged terrorism) are the spawn of genuine grievances. ULFA, for instance, began as a militant manifestation to the agitation against illegal migration from Bangladesh. The fact that it has careened out of control and is now in the hands of anti-India agencies like the ISI of Pakistan is a different matter altogether.

However, some outfits like the DHD are engineered by forces in a bid to counter a stronger power that might be opposing the former's rise. So a specific counter-DHD (Garlosa) strategy must comprehend the natal charts of the outfit. The Dimasa

group is bereft of any ideology and is the unholy remains of a now defunct group, Dima National Security Force (DNSF), which has been operating in N.C. Hills since 1993.

Unlike the NSCN, ULFA and National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), the DNSF was an engineered organisation, formed by certain members of a party, in order to counter the mounting influence of the Communist Party of India—Marxist-Leninist (CPI-ML) in the region. The CPI-ML's clout in the area was reportedly considerable during that period, with excellent contact programmes at the grass-roots. It was also said that the party's writ in the area was so full-bodied that even powerful groups like the NSCN and the ULFA were not able to enter its domain. Additionally, representation in the Parliament from the area was also in the hands of the CPI-ML. This not only raised the worst fears of New Delhi and Dispur

Such subterfuge could have been countered by a variety of means such as rapid development of the area, and a mature democracy like India was perfectly capable of taking such a step. But the option that was chosen instead was to prop up a counter-group—the offshoot of the same group that the government is currently trying to suppress.

about a domino effect to other parts of Assam, but also the apprehension that the stratagem of the People's Republic of China would enter the Hills.

Indeed, such subterfuge could have been countered by a variety of means such as rapid development of the area, and a mature democracy like India was perfectly capable of taking such a step. But the option that was chosen instead was to prop up a counter-group—the offshoot of the same group that the government is currently trying to suppress. Unfortunately, this has become the most convenient

counterweight to a security situation, be it in Kashmir, Manipur or Assam. But it must be understood that quick-fix solutions often lead to worse scenarios in the long term.

Moreover, even when the aggression in the Hills was taking disquieting dimensions, it was happily contemplated that only an intense militarisation of the area and an absurd superimposition of the Mizo model of "clustering" villages in the district would prevent the attacks by opposing groups. The violence took a communal turn, and the tribes, namely Dimasas and eme Nagas who had lived in harmony for decades, began attacking each other.

Advisories from the uninitiated—those without a thorough understanding of the Mizo rebellion—had recommended "clustering", a strategy that failed even before it took off. The reason was simple enough. The tribes were neither willing to leave their traditional villages (especially as the *zhum* cultivation was on in mid-August), nor was there an adequate provision to cater to the temporary "clusters" which were to be erected. The Mizo experience worked because the villagers fled to the "clusters" in order to escape the aerial bombings that were being carried out in the areas of traditional habitation. Incidentally, it was the only counter-insurgency theatre where air power was used.

The situation today: Pros and cons

What, therefore, are the options before the State? The author has recently returned from a field trip to N.C. Hills and has trekked from village-to-village (in an area that he chose to model his study on) in order to glean information about the primary issues. Brief notes on the current situation, followed by a security prescription, are outlined below.

● The arrest of Jewel Garlosa in Bangaluru and the liquidation of Frankie Dimasa, the organisation's foreign secretary, in Guwahati have impacted the cadre morale and the level of violence has come down. The intense heat of the counter-operation compels many cadres to contemplate a ceasefire.

● However, the command and control of the organisation is in the hands of "third-rung" leaders such as Daniel Dimasa, Arthan Hapilla and Maurong Dimasa who rule the roost. These hardcore militants of DHD-J (the faction under James Dimasa) are very close to Garlosa and fully capable of running the organisation in his absence. Although the police captured Daniel and Arthan earlier, both managed to escape during the 2008 Haflong jailbreak and may not tread the path to peace so soon. Moreover, some of these leaders are also outside the country. The military chief of the group, Niranjana Hojai, is reportedly in Singapore and a ceasefire may not be a comprehensive affair with certain leaders and cadres staying away.

But there are reports to suggest that with DHD (Nunisa) faction consenting to deposit their arms under the double-lock system and the DHD-J funds drying up—thanks to the virtual closure of the road and the railway projects in the area—the latter, too, may fall in line sooner or later. Indeed, sources have indicated that Maurong is already in Guwahati for negotiations. But, as mentioned before, a ceasefire must be a comprehensive affair with all leaders and cadres giving up their entire arsenal. Hopefully, the ruse that the Ranjan Daimary faction of the NDFB played on a

complacent dispensation is a vital lesson.

● A military solution to the North-East issue is bound to be a protracted one. Moreover, the terrain in most parts of the N.C. Hills is covered with deep forest and quite inhospitable. Even the "global positioning system" apparatus that aids navigation does not work in certain areas. Such geophysical hurdles are sure to slow-down the desired progress of a military offensive.

● Intelligence / information that emanates from the grass-roots is woefully inadequate. Indeed, the inability of the security forces to dominate the area and infiltrate the populace has rendered it unable to develop the so-called "sources." At any rate, the impression that the author has gathered from speaking to *Gaonburahs* (village headmen) and the villagers is that they are unwilling to act as informers. The inhabitants seem to be painfully aware of the fact that the security forces will leave the area sooner or later, leaving the helpless villagers at the mercy of the terrorists.

Moreover, Dimasas are clannish people and it is a little known fact that there are five clans that make up the Dimasa population. Clan loyalty for the Hasum Sa (Jewel Garlosa) belongs to this clan, which is sprawled over the hill areas

between Kopili and Doyang, and extends to Jatinga River) is as strong as it is for the Hamri Sa, a clan whose inhabitants reside between Kopili and Lanka, and also in areas such as Kheroni and Hojai. Dilip Nunisa, a pro-talk leader, hails from this clan.

A security prescription

Now, it is time for a brief security prescription to deal with the DHD (Garlosa).

● Work on the East-West corridor and broad gauge conversion acts as a "lightning rods" for the terrorists, and finance being their foremost consideration, these projects are constantly under attack. While stopping these projects will not be the best way to assert government control, one may opt for this strategy—if it can be called so—in the absence of any other alternative.

● The "clustering" of villages—mooted by a section of the government—has been gratefully shelved as it makes no sense in the N.C. Hills. Instead, "temporary operating bases" (TOBs) should be set up in the vicinity of the villages or within a 10-15 km radius of the troubled areas from where regular area domination can be carried out. The author has walked from one village to another and it does not take more than 45 minutes to cover the distance even when it rains.

However, if full-strength TOBs are not possible, smaller units will also serve the purpose. The presence of security force will not only deter terrorists but also boost the confidence of local people, now in the middle of their *zhum* cultivation. A comprehensive plan can be worked out and vulnerable areas, especially the general area of Maibong and the likes, can be given priority.

● The train running between Lumding and Haflong can have mounted gun posts at the front and rear, but these should be manned by army personnel. It seems that the sheer strength of the army and its power of retaliation have compelled the DHD (Garlosa) to stay away from the armed forces. The government might not have noticed it yet but the author feels, the authorities should try it out if hostilities start again.

● The ban slapped on the DHD (Garlosa) indicates a positive step. The organisation offered a unilateral ceasefire for three months in the same manner as it had done on March 24, 2008, with a possible intention of gaining some much-needed breathing space. The rejection of the





ceasefire offer and the subsequent ban are, indeed, bold steps—sending out a clear message that the “State cannot be taken for a ride”. But the question that the author wishes to ask is Would the heavens have fallen, had we “played around” with the unilateral ceasefire offer for a while. It would have, at least, saved the lives of innocent Dimasa and Naga Nagas. After all, in statecraft, tactics like *Saam*, *Daam*, *Dand* and *Bhed* are often brought into play to achieve the ultimate goal. But if a confident New Delhi feels that gun can be outgunned, so be it.

However, such a policy may backfire into loss of more innocent lives if the ban on the DHD (Garlosa) and the intensity of government operations are not beefed up with other relevant strategies. One may engineer intelligence operations to wean away important leaders like Maurong Dimasa (the person in charge of the DHD finance), as, indeed, is being reported to be the case. It must also be understood that the State is not facing a group of Islamists inside a built-up area as was the case in Mumbai 26/11. Here we have 100-odd faceless Dimasas, whose most important allies are not only the 4888

sq km of inhospitable terrain and at least a tenth of the district's 186,189-strong population, but also groups like NSCN (IM), who are hell bent on communalising the area in order to further the agenda of Nagalim.

Union Home Secretary G. K. Pillai has stated that there will be a proper audit of the funds allocated for the development of the autonomous councils. This needs utmost attention, as cases have been unearthed where not only corruption has taken deep roots, but funds have also been diverted in order to buy arms for terrorist outfits.

● The development of N.C. Hills must be taken up in right earnest. While there is no limit to development, there are a few immediate steps that should be taken to win back the confidence of the people. The author has witnessed the squalor in which

the people of N.C. Hills live. Moreover, there is no drinking water. Most villagers drink the impure water from ground wells and it remains the root cause of numerous ailments. While it is understandable that safe drinking water cannot be sent to every village, nor can every villager come to central areas to gather water. The authorities must take steps to sanitise water with chemicals and arrange for water filtering at village sites. Public awareness programmes should be held by the district administration and sanitation teams should be sent to remote areas with security forces, if necessary.

Another way to help villagers is to introduce solar lamps. The author has seen a few in some of the remote villages he visited. These have been set up primarily by the army and, reportedly, at their own expense. The provision of such lamps would go a long way in instilling confidence into the people.

● The educational system in the district is in a pitiable condition as well. A comprehensive plan must be drawn up to revamp the system, and provisions must be made for proper buildings, teaching staff and other essential requirements.

● Union Home Secretary G. K. Pillai has stated that there will be a proper audit of the funds allocated for the development of the autonomous councils. This needs utmost attention, as cases have been unearthed where not only corruption has taken deep roots, but funds have also been diverted in order to buy arms for terrorist outfits. The arrest of Mohit Hojai, chief executive member of the N.C. Hills Autonomous District Council, is a clear indication of the unholy nexus between politicians, militants and bureaucrats.

● But, the most important step that must be undertaken—and this has not yet happened—is that the government must regularly meet the governed. This must happen even if it means undertaking an arduous five-hour trek through an inhospitable terrain. **DSA**

The writer is a Security and Terrorism Analyst who has penned a number of books and numerous academic papers on security and strategy. He has served as a Security Advisor and worked as an “Expert on North-East” in the National Security Council Secretariat, Government of India.



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
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budget crunch bogging down defence modernisation

Brig. Gurmeet Kanwal



The figures below amply illustrate that although budget allocation has been revised downwards every year at the RE stage (except in 2004-05), the MoD cannot fully utilise the amount at any point of time (Standing Committee on Defence, 14th Lok Sabha, Demand for Grants 2008-09, 29th Report, April 2008).



Graph not in scale

India is among the largest spenders in the global arms market. The country is expected to spend US 50 billion on arms procurement during the 11th Defence Plan period spanning 2007-12 despite the fact that its defence budget is pegged at less than 2 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP). Even as threats and challenges to national security

procurement is dependent almost entirely on imports since the Indian defence industry has not come of age. The defence procurement process has been laborious and tardy despite a few policy reforms and only recently, it has started to come out of the morass that it was languishing in.

Defence budget: adequate or otherwise?

The amount allocated for defence in fiscal 2009-2010 is Rs. 141,703 crore (US 32 billion). This is 34 per cent higher than the budget estimates (BE) for 2008-09. Of this, the amount earmarked for expenditure on the capital account, which provides funds for modernisation, is Rs. 54,824 crore (US 12 billion) as against Rs. 48,007 crore (US 10.5 billion) in 2008-09. However, the increased amount cannot be utilised by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to initiate new schemes for weapons and equipment acquisitions as carried-forward contractual obligations, and hike in the global prices of weapons systems, ammunition and defence equipment (usually between 10-12 per cent per annum) will neutralise most of the increase. Consequently, plans for defence modernisation will continue to stagnate.

By whichever parameter one examines the defence allocations, the results are disappointing. In fact, the overall defence budget as a percentage of the GDP has been declining steadily. It was 3.4 per cent in 1987-88, 2.30 per cent in 2004-05 and 2.10 per cent in 2006-07. Now it appears

The Committee are deeply concerned to note that the Ministry of Defence was compelled to surrender funds to the tune of Rs. 5,000 crore, Rs. 9,000 crore and Rs. 5,000 crore at the Revised Estimates stage of 2001-02, 2002-03 and 2003-04, respectively, to meet the deficits. The budgetary ceilings imposed by the Ministry of Finance in the year 2005-06 have led to the downsizing of the total projected capital requirements of the Defence Services from adequately (sic) Rs. 44,123.86 crore to Rs. 34,375.14 crore which fails to address the security concerns of the nation. The arbitrary caps on budget utilisation over a period of time have taken a toll on almost all sectors of Defence... —Standing Committee on Defence, 14th Lok Sabha, Second Report, Demand for Grants, April 2005.

have burgeoned in recent years, plans to modernise the armed forces have been stagnating.

The scenario certainly causes concern as large amounts of unspent funds on the capital account are surrendered each year; bureaucratic red tape slows down the acquisition process and defence

to have settled at a little below 2 per cent of the GDP. The last time when India's defence expenditure had fallen below 2 per cent of the country's GDP was shortly before the 1962 war with China, the emotional baggage of which still weighs down India's political and military leadership.

The Standing Committee on Defence in Parliament has repeatedly recommended that the outlay for defence should be increased to at least 3 per cent of the GDP. "The Committee strongly recommend that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) should take up the matter with the Ministry of Finance (MoF) for providing a minimum 3.0 per cent of GDP for Defence Services every year in order to ensure a fixed amount to carry out their modernisation, capital acquisition and R&D programme, and fulfil the need-based requirements of the Defence Forces" (Standing Committee on Defence, 14th Lok Sabha, Demand for Grants 2007-08, 16th Report, April 2007). 11th Finance Commission, a constitutionally mandated authority, had suggested that defence expenditure should go up progressively to at least 3 per cent of the GDP by 2004.

The average defence expenditure was pegged at 16.48 per cent of the Central Government expenditure during the 1980s. But it came down to 14.63 per cent during the next decade and the trend continued till 2000. Similarly, defence expenditure, as a ratio of the total government expenditure (Central plus state), came down to 7.75 per cent during the 1990s from a previous high of 10.5 per cent in the 80s. During this period, the rupee, too, had sharply depreciated against the US dollar—from Rs. 16 to a dollar to a record low of Rs. 46 to a dollar. An inflation rate of seven to eight per cent further added to the woes and the defence budget declined by more than 10 per cent per annum in terms of constant rupees. This led to a plunge in India's conventional defence capabilities and preparedness for war, and emboldened Pakistan to launch its ill-fated intrusions into the Kargil sector of Jammu and Kashmir in May, 1999.

Let us now consider China and Pakistan, India's major military adversaries with whom the country has fought several wars over still-unresolved territorial and boundary disputes. While Beijing spends 3.5 per cent of its GDP on national security, Islamabad has opted for a whopping 4.5 per cent. In fact, according to the 2008-09 annual report of MoD, China's defence expenditure has shown a blistering double-digit growth rate for the last 20 years.



Steadily declining defence budgets in terms of constant rupees are gradually eroding our national security capabilities. Continuous deployment of the armed forces for various operational commitments and near-absence of genuine modernisation are also undermining the country's preparedness for war, and eating into the slender qualitative edge that India might have enjoyed over its military adversaries.

There is already a quantitative gap between the 2.5 million strong People's Liberation Army of China and the Indian armed forces, which include only 1.325 million personnel. As China is modernising its armed forces at a rapid pace and India's modernisation can, at best, be described as being undertaken in fits and starts, the present quantitative gap will soon become a qualitative edge. If our long, slow crawl to modernisation is allowed to continue, Beijing will become strong enough to dominate India by the end of the 13th Defence Plan (2017-2022). And once that happens, the Asian superpower is sure to dictate its own terms and force India to

accept an unsavoury solution to the territorial and boundary disputes.

Shrinking allocation hits upgrades

Every year, fund allocations requested by the three Services are routinely pared down by the Defence Ministry in the projections, it makes to the Ministry of Finance. The MoF treats these projections as a "wish list" and reduces them further by nearly 25 per cent. For example, during 2004-05, the Services projected a requirement of

approximately Rs. 103,000 crore; the MoD reduced it to Rs. 87,000 crore and the MoF allotted only Rs. 77,000 crore—a shortfall of 26 per cent. Such reductions are effected arbitrarily and mostly without consulting the armed forces. Therefore, almost till the budget day, the Services are uncertain of their likely allocations for the next financial year.

It is unbelievable that such a situation exists even after 60 years of exposure to national five-year plans and defence planning. It also indicates the total disinclination of successive governments to involve the senior leadership of the armed forces in the decision-making process when it comes to national security. Neither does it augur well for long-term perspective planning.

Affected by inflation and foreign exchange fluctuation, the steadily declining defence budget (in terms of constant rupees) cannot but hinder the modernisation of armed forces and the replacement of obsolete weapon systems and equipment. In other words, the ongoing revolution in military affairs (RMA) has passed the armed forces by.

The Indian army, for example, desperately needs new 155 mm self-propelled and towed guns for the plains and the mountains. It also requires reconnaissance helicopters, as well as modern weapons and equipment for counter-insurgency operations. The air force needs to replace its obsolete MiG-21 aircraft with more modern fighter-bombers, acquire more AWACS aircraft and upgrade its air defence radar grid.

The navy is still many decades away from acquiring genuine blue water capability, which is crucially necessary for ensuring India's maritime security and safeguarding its international trade interests. The coast guard needs a larger fleet of fast patrol craft and helicopters to secure India's long coastline and the large exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Maritime reconnaissance capabilities also need to be considerably enhanced if a repeat of the Mumbai terror attacks is to be avoided.

Unspent funds, unmet needs

As if this was not bad enough, a large chunk of the funds earmarked for capital expenditure, which goes towards modernisation, is surrendered year after year. Successive Finance Ministers have been using reductions in the defence budget at the Revised Estimates (RE) stage

As China is modernising its armed forces at a rapid pace and India's modernisation can, at best, be described as being undertaken in fits and starts, the present quantitative gap will soon become a qualitative edge.




as one of the tools to manage the country's burgeoning fiscal deficit. The Standing Committee on Defence has observed "Every year the annual budgetary allocation for the armed forces, particularly for capital acquisition, is being reduced at the RE stage as a result of which a number of schemes do not fructify, which causes delay and cost overruns in the modernisation of the armed forces."

Funds also remain unspent due to bureaucratic red tape and the fear of strictures being passed by the Central Vigilance Commissioner for tardy defence procurement procedures. Most importantly, the MoD has not been able to ensure that at least the reduced funds are spent fully. Nearly 14 per cent of the budget amount, varying between Rs. 5,000 and Rs. 9,000 crore, remained unspent every year from 1999-2000 onwards till the issue was arrested in 2004-05. This year, the RE figures are lower than the BE figures and the unspent amount is approximately Rs. 7,000 crore.

What's hindering India's defence growth?

Steadily declining defence budgets in

terms of constant rupees are gradually eroding our national security capabilities. Continuous deployment of the armed forces for various operational commitments and near-absence of genuine modernisation are also undermining the country's preparedness for war, and eating into the slender qualitative edge that India might have enjoyed over its military adversaries.

With the economy growing at a compound rate of seven to eight per cent annually, surely the nation can afford to invest 3 to 3.5 per cent of its GDP as an insurance premium for national security, especially when a huge amount of Rs. 1,50,000 crore is earmarked for wasteful subsidies that seldom reach the actual beneficiaries. The government must show its concern and political courage necessary to safeguard the country's national security interests. It, that cannot happen without adequate financial provisions for the modernisation of the armed forces in sync with the requisites of a 21st century military. Unless necessary steps are taken to boost the country's defence, there will be unbridgeable chasms between the promise and the reality, and the final outcome will be shockingly grave. 

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Puja Raina Mahaldar

Much has been said and written about the changing face of defence and security, thanks to the most revolutionary advances in military technology. Translating the advantages of fast-paced technologies into suitable applications is no easy job, though. Nations across the globe often spend astronomical amounts to identify and meet the technological needs of its armed

DRDO: setting the road map for success



forces—so that they may attain the pace and accuracy required for hi-tech defence operations. A fundamental component of national security, defence research, therefore, focuses on optimising the technical capabilities of the armed forces within a stipulated budget. Clearly, it is a vital driver, enhancing military aptitude, competence and success.

Linked to various short, medium or long-term defence requirements, defence research enables a country to

- Design, manufacture or purchase most pertinent arms and technologies in order to fulfil present and potential operational requirements.
- Strengthen its existing performance and enhance its new capabilities by adopting far-reaching, novel technology solutions.
- Recognise and spot upcoming national threats and prospective way-outs for them.
- Ensure a strong foundation for operational, procurement and capacity analysis, and reduce expenditure and risks.
- Focus on improving interoperability among allies.

Such extensive agendas compel defence research to look beyond the present requirements of a nation and look at future technologies for better efficiency. The entire exercise remains an integrated effort on the part of scientists, managers and allied professionals who innovate revolutionary, high-payoff ideas and deliver indigenous technologies that become a viaduct between fundamental discoveries and innovative military potentials.

How defence research started in India?

In 1958, India felt the need for a research organisation to conduct scientific experiments in a laboratory environment so that the country might build complete prototypes of military systems. Subsequently, the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) came into being with Dr. D.S. Kothari as the

scientific adviser to *Raksha Mantri* (Defence Minister).

DRDO was set up by amalgamating some 10 Technical Development Establishments (TDEs) of the Indian Army and the Directorate of Technology Development and Production (DTDP) with the Defence Science Organisation (DSO). Before the all-important merger, most of these organisations played an advisory role instead of operating at the implementation level. The formation of DRDO, however, changed their main role from advising to design, development and production of weapons, sensors, sighting, communication systems and more. The entire metamorphosis was effected to ensure high-end research and development in hardware, software and processes that would meet the essential requirements of Indian defence forces.

Evolution and achievements

Since its inception, DRDO has undergone major reinvention in a bid to cater to the entire spectrum of defence and security. The first decade featured a slew of activities including advising, planning and learning, along with setting up of research laboratories. It was also a phase for meeting short-term requirements such as maintaining, substituting and improving imported defence equipment. Initially, the organisation developed small arms and ammunitions. However, in the next decade (1970-80), DRDO focused on reverse engineering and started gaining the system engineering know-how. The period spanning 1980-85 witnessed a peak growth

with several laboratories taking up contemporary systems development. Today, DRDO has a vast network of 52 laboratories grouped under eight major disciplines—aeronautics, armaments, electronics & computer systems, combat

vehicles & engineering, missiles, special materials, naval systems and life sciences. The total staff strength is nearly 30,000 with 7,454 scientists, 10,433 technical personnel and 10,000 administration & support personnel working for the premier organisation.

In a span of 51 years, DRDO has evolved into a leading technology generator and system developer, specialising in a wide range of strategically significant military systems and critical defence equipment like armaments, missiles, light combat aircraft (LCA), main battle tank (MBT) and electronic warfare (EW) applications. It boasts of a wide spectrum of core competencies spanning such critical areas as system design and integration of complex sensors, weapon systems and platforms, high-end software packages, functional materials, test and evaluation, technology transfer and absorption. In addition, adequate expertise and infrastructure have been built up for basic / applied research in relevant areas, besides ensuring best-possible quality, safety and project & technology management.


The organisation has developed multi-dimensionally in terms of subject disciplines, number of laboratories, stature and achievements. Its key functions now include

- Design, development and manufacturing of state-of-the-art sensors, weapon systems, platforms and allied equipment for Indian defence services.
- Providing technological solutions and services to optimise combat effectiveness and promoting the well-being of troops.
- Developing infrastructure, dedicated quality manpower and dimensions for strong indigenous technology base.

In addition to these key responsibilities, DRDO devises and implements scientific research programmes to enhance the country's national security systems. It also functions as a nodal agency for implementation of major defence-related programmes, partnering national scientific institutions, public sector units (PSUs) and private agencies in the process. These programmes have led to the production of world-class weapon systems and equipment on par with our defence requirements. DRDO also assists the Services by providing technical advice on formulation of staff requirements, evaluation of systems to be acquired, fire and explosive safety and mathematical / statistical analysis of operational problems.

In a bid to achieve its vision of self-

DRDO products...



Systems/Products	Cost* (Rs in crore)
Missiles Systems	4784
Electronic Systems	17000
Aeronautics & Avionics	7850
Combat Vehicles & Engg	3950
Armament Systems	8147
Naval systems	434
Materials & Life Sciences	1710
Total	43875

* Figures are approximate estimations

Major DRDO products

DRDO has developed a number of technologies and systems, of which quite a few have been productionised. Till date, it has procured production order worth Rs. 35,000 crore while the total R&D costs stand at Rs. 12,000 crore. Products worth Rs. 12,500 crore have been delivered and the systems have been inducted without a hitch. Here is a list of major products developed by DRDO.

Categories	Products & systems developed / accepted / inducted
Aeronautical Systems	Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas is India's first indigenously designed, developed and produced multi-role LCA. Induction of first squadron of 20 LCAs is scheduled for 2010-11. The Naval variant of the LCA is also likely to roll out by 2010. Other success stories are Lakshya (pilotless target aircraft), Nishant (unmanned aerial vehicle), electronic warfare suites, radar warning receivers including high accuracy direction finding (HADF) RWR, mission computers and avionics upgrades for several fighter aircraft. Missile approach warning system and laser warning system have also been developed and are being fitted on various military aircraft and helicopters. As spin-offs, variants of Kaveri engine are being developed for propulsion of marine vessels with great advantages.
Armament Systems	Large number of armaments, designed and developed by DRDO, has been inducted in the armed forces. Over a million pieces of 7.62 mm Ishapore self-loading rifle (SLR) developed by DRDO were produced till replaced by 5.56 mm INSAS (Indian Small Arms System), made available in fixed & foldable butt versions of assault rifle & LMG, all firing the same ammunition and having 70 commonality of parts. Multi-barrel rocket system Pinaka, FSAPDS ammunition, influence mines Mk-I, multimode grenade under-barrel grenade launcher, 84 mm light weight launcher, bund blasting device, instant fire detection & suppression for BMP-II, .303 inch and 7.62 mm non-lethal bullets are examples of DRDO's wide range of products.
Combat Vehicle & Engineering	Over 50 Arjun MBTs (main battle tanks) including 45 tanks for the 1st Arjun Armoured Regiment and 649 combat improved Ajeya tanks equipped with explosive reactive armour (ERA), global positioning system (GPS), integrated fire detection & suppression system (IFDSS) & reconfigured smoke grenade discharger (SGD) have been produced. Other major achievements are BHIM-76 self-propelled 155 mm gun, Ex-tank - a combination of T-72 (Ajeya) chassis and the most advanced MBT Arjun weapon system, bridge layer tank Arjun (capability to convert Arjun tank to BLT within few hours), BLT T-72, SARVATRA mobile bridge laying system (up to 75m within 100 minutes), SAKAV 46m single span bridge system, MLC70 and MLC 40 modular bridges, carrier command post tracked, BMP-II, armoured amphibious dozer, mobile camouflage system (integrated in MBT Arjun), NBC protected integrated field shelter, remotely operated vehicle Daksh - a robotic vehicle capable of remotely handling IED, riot control vehicle, unmanned ground vehicle (UGV), trackway expedient mat ground surfacing, armoured ambulance BMP-II, carrier mortar tracked on BMP-II, containerised operation theatre complex on wheels, ground support vehicles for various indigenous strategic and tactical missiles, Nishant launcher, counter mine flail (CMF) on T-72 Tank, snow galleries, Micro-pile foundation for the effective transfer of snow pressure.
Electronic & Computer Systems	Artillery combat command control system (ACCCS), Indian Doppler radar INDRA-I & II, Rajendra - multifunction phased array radar, super vision maritime patrol radar (SV-2000 MPAR), avalanche victim detector (AVD), battle field surveillance radar (BFSR) - a man-portable, battlefield and perimeter surveillance radar produced in large numbers, electronic warfare systems SAMUKTA & SANGRAHA for Army and Navy, 3D-CAR (Central Acquisition Radar) medium range early warning sensor Revathi for Navy, weapon locating radar, EON 51 - electro-optic fire control system, briefcase SATCOM terminal, Sectel (secure telephone), Sujav - a compact communication electronic warfare suit, integrated weapon system simulation, eye safe lasers, laser designator, PRF code recognition device for decoding the PRF codes of laser target designators, laser warning sensor, palmtop green microchip laser module, passive switching, EOCM-class laser system for both anti-sensor as well as dazzling applications with an operational range of 2.5 km, 6.5 KW pulsed band and 10 KW pulsed Ku band coupled cavities TWT for airborne radars, S-band 130 KW (pulsed) coupled-cavity TWT.
Life Sciences Systems	Life support systems for Army, Navy and Air force Personnel, combat free fall system capable to withstand the harsh conditions of free fall from 30,000 ft, NBC canister, water poison detection kit, portable decontamination apparatus, NBC filters/ventilation systems, CW type A/B decontamination kit/solution, herbal anti oxidant supplement, high altitude adapted & fast growing broiler sheep, biodiesel production, cold-tolerant hybrid vegetables, genetically engineered cold-tolerant vegetables, hyperbaric oxygen therapy chamber (Samudrasuta), one-man high altitude pulmonary oedema (HAPO) chamber, heating gloves & socks for extreme cold conditions, self-contained self-heating system to warm ready-to-eat packed food at 650C, long-shelf-life and ready-to-eat packaged food, bio-digester for treatment of human waste (for extreme cold condition; it is also being introduced in Indian Railway coaches to avoid soiling of tracks), multi-insect repellent DEPA, computerised pilot selection system (CPSS), NBC and high-altitude medical products.
Materials	AB class steel for naval applications, titanium sponge, high-temperature titanium alloys for aerospace applications, NBC recce vehicle, NBC protective clothing/permeable suits, NBC water purification system, camouflage pattern generation software, synthetic camouflage net, mobile medical post for Navy, extreme cold weather clothing systems, blast protection suits, synthetic life jacket, anti-riot polycarbonate shield, anti-riot helmet, brake pads for aircraft, heavy alloy armour penetrator rods, jackal armour, Kanchan armour, hydraulic pipeline for submarine applications, investment casting of turbine components etc.
Missile & Strategic Systems	Surface-to-surface strategic missile systems Agni I (700 km), Agni II (2000 km) and Agni III (3000 km), Prithvi series of surface-to-surface missiles, BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles for Army and Navy, Dhanush - ship-launched SS missile, Akash - multi-directional, multi-target SAM area defence weapon system, Nag - third-generation anti-tank missile, air defence system against ballistic missiles of up to 2000 km class, both low altitude and high altitude (80 km), RINS - ring laser gyro-based INS-GPS-GLONASS for long-range missiles and Aircraft, millimetre wave seeker, MINGS- MEMS based hybrid navigation system, computerised war games for Army & Air force.
Naval Systems	Ship-borne sonar HUMSA, airborne dunking sonar MIHIR, submarine sonar USHUS, torpedo advanced light (TAL), torpedoes - fire control system and advanced experimental, advanced panoramic sonar hull mounted (APSOH), PACHENDRI A - integrated submarine sonar and tactical fire control system, underwater telephone (UWT), TADPOLE sonobuoy high altitude deployable sonar, auto-controlled carbon dioxide control system, impressed current cathodic protection system for ship hull, indium activated aluminium galvanic sacrificial alloy system, polylist dock block - a substitute for teakwood used for dry docking of ships, heavy-duty non-skid paint, 250 KW silver oxide-zinc battery, IR suppression system For Naval platforms.



reliance, DRDO has progressively sought the help of Indian industries in areas like defence production and technology development. DRDO-industry meets are regularly held to appraise industry veterans about opportunities in relevant fields. Positive interactions with key industrial / business bodies such as Confederation of Indian Industries (CII), Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and Associated Chambers of Commerce & Industry (ASSOCHAM) also augur well for those major players keen to enter defence production.

Can DRDO meet the self-reliance goal?

The need of the hour for India and its defence research is to be self-reliant. It is highly demoralising that even after 63 years of Independence and 51 years of DRDO functioning, the country is still importing 70 per cent of its defence equipment. The government seems to have taken ample measures so that by 2010, we may procure at least 70 per cent of the defence requirements from indigenous sources. But in spite of specific policies and pre-eminent efforts, India has not even reached the half-way mark till date. We continue to import from other countries / foreign research organisations while indigenous production is regularly sidetracked.

It will not be incorrect to state that India as a nation has failed to be self-reliant in defence production despite decades of efforts and a huge expenditure. The most urgent requirement right now is to realise the importance of indigenising military technologies. The global trend further highlights how India is lagging behind in

this vital area. Most of the geopolitical powerhouses rely on home-grown technologies and their arms imports are quite insignificant compared to total imports (only 0.5 per cent). In contrast, India remains one of the biggest arms purchasers, annually buying defence equipment worth Rs. 40,000 crore and more. It is eight per cent of the country's total imports and 50 per cent of the total defence expenditure.


It is not difficult to understand why importing technologies from others will not serve our purpose in the long run. Ready-to-use, branded products might be the all-time favourites of decision-makers at various levels. But there are ample reasons why we should not gun for it.

- We can't obtain the latest technologies as no country would like to share its cutting-edge defence advantages and security gadgets.
- Consequently, what we acquire is bound to be either obsolete or unsuitable. What we generally get may not match our specific requirements.
- Technologies that we buy tend to be very expensive and often take a heavy toll on the country's economy without delivering the desired results.
- Imported technologies are not designed

keeping our personnel, climatic and environmental scenario in mind.

Thanks to these formidable roadblocks, India must recognise the value of a well-established research-development-production ecosystem, whose experience and expertise can be widely used to bring in a military revolution. DRDO, too, has to speed up its growth process and enhance its core competencies despite the meagre resources at its disposal.

Now that the government has given its nod to joint ventures, one easy solution is to ensure that the private sector plays a growing role in defence production. DRDO should increasingly involve big corporations and business leaders into research and development activities. It should also envision new activities in the international arena including joint ventures, international collaborations and defence equipment export. As these joint ventures need to be successful for the benefit of all parties involved, India will soon have an easy access to "sunrise" technologies on board rather than the "passé" ones it is compelled to purchase at present. The new strategy and the new role will help the organisation make a global impact so that India switches role from procurer to exporter and DRDO, in turn, becomes highly visible among the world scientific fraternity. **DSA**



☐ Puja Raina Mahaldar

A tank is a tracked, armoured fighting vehicle designed for frontline combat which combines operational mobility and tactical offensive with defensive capabilities. Firepower is normally provided by a large-calibre main gun in a rotating turret and secondary machine-guns while heavy armour and all-terrain mobility provide protection for the tank and its crew—allowing it to perform all primary tasks of the armoured troops on the battlefield. Tanks were first introduced by the British during World War I as the means to break the deadlock of trench warfare. These combat vehicles were first deployed at the Battle of Somme in limited numbers. During construction, to conceal their true identity as weapons, these were designated as water carriers for the Mesopotamian campaign and referred to as “tanks” (as in ‘water tank’).

Interwar developments in both design and tactics evolved during World War II, producing important concepts of armoured warfare which persist to this day. The erstwhile Soviet Union introduced the T-34, one of the best tanks in service throughout the war and one of the forerunners to the main battle tank (MBT). Germany introduced blitzkrieg, a strategy which makes use of massed concentrations of tanks supported by artillery and air power to break through the enemy front, surround enemy forces and accomplish objectives.

Tank designing underwent radical changes during the closing stages of World War II and the subsequent Cold War period that witnessed the use of large turrets, better suspension systems, more powerful engines, large-calibre guns and sloped armour. Improved fire-control systems, gyroscopic gun stabilisation, radio communication, laser-range finder and infra-red night vision equipment have been introduced since then, and constantly improved upon. With the advent of anti-tank guided missiles and anti-tank weapons, the armour technology has also progressed.

Medium tanks of World War II have evolved into main battle tanks. Among the tanks of 1950s, British Centurion, Soviet T-54/55 and the US M-48 formed the bulk of the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The contemporary Leopard 2, M1 Abrams, Challenger and T-90 also owe

MBT Arjun combat vehicle with a difference

their lineage to these former classes.

The three traditional factors determining a tank's effectiveness are firepower, protection and mobility. Since World War II, the economics of tank production governed by the ease of manufacture and cost, and the impact of a given tank design on logistics and field maintenance capabilities, have been accepted as important factors in determining how many tanks a nation can afford to field in its force structure.

Why MBT Arjun?

The main battle tank occupies a pivotal role in the present day battlefield due to its ability to provide accurate fire power with cross-country mobility, reasonable protection from conventional and nuclear threats and flexible response to changing battle situations. By the end of the 1971 war,

the Indian Army had realised the limitations of its imported tank fleet, especially under the harsh desert conditions of Rajasthan, the crucial north-western Indian State bordering Pakistan. As a result, the need to introduce an indigenous MBT design was strongly felt—so that the country would remain on par with super powers in terms of design, manufacture and quality of armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs). What's more, India would be able to break away from foreign technology dependence and thus reduce the draining of foreign exchange (FE). The government, therefore, sanctioned a project in May, 1974, for design and development of an indigenous MBT. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) was to carry out the entire project at a total cost of Rs. 15.50 crore (FE Rs. 3.70 crore) with a product development cycle (PDC) of 10 years.

Arjun: Beginning of a new journey

The timeframe and cost of the unique project have undergone revisions on three occasions—in 1980, 1987 and 2000. The reasons for those revisions include major changes in qualitative requirements, developmental delays for new systems / technologies, delay in import of components and sub-systems due to import embargoes, increase in number of prototypes, difficulties in organising field evaluation and re-establishing production lines and vendor sources. The final developmental cost at the time of project closure in March, 1995, stood at Rs. 305.60 crore. However, tanks of similar capabilities developed in a foreign country would have cost at least 10 times more than the final cost incurred by DRDO.

Several prototypes and pre-production vehicles were developed during 1983-1995 and subjected to extensive field trials of more than 90,000 km and 9000 rounds. Some deficiencies rectified during the trials were higher wear-and-tear of hydro-pneumatic suspension, road wheels, dust extractor and radiator fan blades. After satisfactory performance, the tank was cleared for production with due approval from the Army.

The Indian Army placed an indent for the full complement of 124 Arjun MBTs in March, 2000. In order to meet the production requirement, additional infrastructure facilities and machine tools were established at the Heavy Vehicles





Factory (HVF), Avadi (Tamil Nadu), and Ordnance Factory, Medak (Andhra Pradesh). During production, medium fording capabilities were also incorporated in the battle tank. The present batch of 124 tanks is to be delivered by March, 2010.

One of the issues that emerged during the accelerated usage-cum-reliability (AUCRT) trials (held between November 2007 and August 2008) was the failure of transmission bearings from M/S Renk, Germany. All AUCRT modifications were systematically attended to and the subsequent performance of the tank fully met the required standards. As suggested by the Army after the AUCRT trials, Arjun tanks were also subjected to rigorous trials and assessments by a third party auditor (an internationally reputed tank manufacturer). After extensive evaluation, the reputed tank manufacturer confirmed that MBT Arjun is an excellent tank with very good mobility and firepower characteristics suitable for the Indian desert.

The indigenously developed tank has evolved strategically as a very competent armoured vehicle which conforms to the quality requirements laid down by the Army. It compares excellently with all heavy class of tanks available across the world. The new genre is suitable for most of our

border areas and a total of 45 tanks have already been handed over to the Army by HVF, Avadi.

The state-of-the-art technologies incorporated in the Arjun include modern integrated fire control system with fire control computer and LRF (Laser range finder), hydro-pneumatic suspension, Kanchan armour, highly lethal and accurate FSAPDS (fin stabilised armour piercing discarding sabot) ammunition, integrated fire detection & suppression system and NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical) protection. The major imported systems in the tank are the power-pack and the gun control system from Germany and the Delft-SAGEM gunner's main sight from OIP, Belgium. It is planned to reduce the percentage of import content to less than 30 per cent with the manufacture of about 500 tanks.

In spite of these cutting-edge features, Arjun is often compared with the Russian T-90. However, the two do not belong to the same class and each has its special features. In MBT Arjun, we have more power-to-weight ratio, hydro-pneumatic suspension for better ride comfort and a stable platform to fire on the move, better quality gun control system and fire control system etc. Missile firing capability of Arjun has also been demonstrated and can be incorporated if required. The T-90 tank

has missile-firing capability and a lower silhouette. Both the tanks are, therefore, essential for the Indian Army - depending on specific requirements.

What's next for DRDO?

DRDO is also working on the development of the futuristic Mark II MBT with suitable technological upgrades, which can be introduced after the completion of the present version. The organisation has core competence in the area of combat vehicle engineering and possesses full confidence and capabilities when it comes to developing futuristic combat vehicles. Any battle tank has a service life of 30 years and goes through technology upgradation progressively. Since MBT Arjun is an indigenous tank, it will be easier to upgrade it and the Mark II MBT-Arjun will be a viable platform for the futuristic use as well. Given the competence of MBT Arjun, there is high probability of winning export orders. In fact, a South American country has recently shown keen interest in procuring this tank. If such a trend continues, India may soon flourish in the field of defence exports and make its mark in the global market. **DSA**

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need of the hour: An armed forces' commission



K. Subrahmanyam

Defence modernisation is certainly gathering pace in India, especially after a significant rise in the country's defence budget this year. But unlike popular belief, defence advancement is not limited to equipment upgradation alone. If India has to realise its true potentials, the policy-makers of this country must review the structure, role and integrated operations of the Services without further delay. The Armed Forces of India stand to win, or lose—depending on what vision the country embraces.

equipment modernisation. It has also been urged that the Services headquarters should be merged with the Ministry of Defence and the Service Chiefs should have the power, status and relationship with the Defence Minister like that of a Union Secretary. Above all, there has been the long-urged demand for a Chief of Defence Staff.

While all these demands are being pursued in real earnest, there is no one to point out that the country should have a comprehensive look at its armed forces as a whole. Their composition, relative sizes and organisation, their national and international role in the years to come, their respective command & control and their incorporation in the nation's policy-making—all these must be looked into in order to ensure maximum efficiency and best possible results.

The situation is not dissimilar to what is obtained in police, justice delivery, education or democratic governance. The demand is for incremental and sectoral changes and not for basic root-and-branch reform. But we are here to make out a case that there is an urgent need for an armed forces commission which will propose a comprehensive road map in order to develop a world-class, comprehensive and international security capability on land, sea, air and outer space.

What matters most: A credible defence structure

India inherited its armed forces from the British Raj in 1947. However, all major nations across the world have carried out more than one round of reforms since then and drastically reshaped the Services. In contrast, Indian Defence Ministry is still carrying on with the vintage organisations and structures of the World War II. While the follow-up of the Kargil Committee report led to some modifications in decision-making and intelligence organisations, the Services themselves were unaffected. There are talks about revolution in military affairs and net-centric warfare, and there have been three to four generational changes in combat equipment, quantum jumps in communication capabilities and introduction of computers. But such measures have had no impact on the organisation, command & control, and jointness in conceptualisation, planning, training and execution, so far as the armed forces of India are concerned.

There was a time up to the end of the World War II when there was a clear cut role divide between diplomacy and military.

There is a considerable debate in the country on what should be done to help us meet the security challenges of the 21st century. While opinions and counter-opinions hit us hard, we mostly focus on enhancing India's capabilities to counter the Chinese offensive. On other occasions, there are talks on learning to walk tall among the giants—so that India may rapidly turn into a global power on par with China and the USA.

Based on the assessments and wish lists of the three Services, there are also demands to modernise our armed forces and upgrade them to world-class level. But these demands are mostly limited to

The idea of having the entire force under one chief is an inheritance from the British Raj when India was only a theatre command in the Imperial Defence System. The continuation of that practice militates against the creation of a permanent chairman of the Chiefs of Staff since there is a justifiable concern about creating a permanent chairman who may be in active command of all forces.

The armed forces moved into the picture after diplomacy failed and their task was to win the war—so that politicians might secure the most advantageous terms to advance national interest. In the nuclear age, all that has changed.

Now, the role of armed forces is not so much to win wars as to prevent those through deterrence and dissuasion. In this situation, diplomacy, as well as postures

and policies of armed forces, form a continuum in national policy-making. This is precisely the reason why all over the world, the armed forces' headquarters remain an integral part of the Government and Chiefs of Staff are among the primary advisers to the Defence Minister and the Head of the Government. The Indian defence set-up is an anomaly in today's world though, since the armed forces'

headquarters remain outside the Government.

The second major anomaly is to have the Chief of Staff as the commander of all forces in his service. No chief in the modern age has commanded 35 divisions. It is impractical and the sheer administrative burden affords little time to the chief for long-term planning or carrying out innovations. That might have worked when India was thinking of an army of 3,00,000.

During the World War II, in all other major powers except the USA, field commanders were senior to the Chiefs of Staff at the headquarters. Even now, the US armed forces have, in each Service, more than one four-star general or admiral. The idea of having the entire force under one chief is an inheritance from the British Raj when India was only a theatre command in the Imperial Defence System. The continuation of that practice militates against the creation of a permanent chairman of the Chiefs of Staff since there is a justifiable concern about creating a permanent chairman who may be in active command of all forces. Therefore, creation of theatre commands and the Chief of Staff

shedding his command over the forces are vital for a modern Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff system with a permanent chairman. The integration of the Services' headquarters with the Government is equally important.

There is a lot of ill-informed talk about a Chief of Defence Staff. In Britain, the active command of all forces of the three Services is vested in the Chief of Defence Staff since he is to lead the combined force into a NATO operation. Britain does not envisage an independent role for its forces. The Falklands was an exception. The Chiefs of Staff in the UK are mere housekeepers for the respective forces. But this system is wholly unsuitable for India. The appropriate system for a country with multiple theatres of military responsibility is the American system of theatre commands and the Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff system.

New horizons, oft-missed points

Today we hear a lot about our strategic partnerships with different major powers and also hold land, sea and air exercises with them. This is a far cry from the days of Cold War when India was, so to speak, militarily isolated. When we were attacked by the Chinese in 1962, we sought help from various major powers of the world. In 1971, when threatened by a Pakistan-China-US line-up at the time of Bangladesh Liberation War, India concluded the Indo-Soviet Treaty to generate deterrence.

However, today India is a nuclear power, a missile power and a space power. India is in a position to be a provider of international security instead of being a mere recipient of it. This is where the strategic partnerships become meaningful. This was demonstrated when the Indian Navy undertook the responsibility to patrol the Malacca Straits during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The Indian Navy was also deployed near the Gulf of Aden and the Somali coast during anti-piracy operations. India's role in the UN peacekeeping operations has a long history as well.

Earlier, our security was defined in terms of protecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of India. In fact, Indian armed forces were solely focused on that task. Since the scenario has changed and India is recognised as one of the six global balancers of power, we should be prepared to carry out international security tasks in cooperation with other major balancers.

It is clearly recognised that in the present international security milieu, the probability of a war among the major powers is virtually nil. For two nuclear powers like India and Pakistan, it cannot be more than a short, limited war in case the worst happens. The Indian Army's size has been determined by more orthodox and traditional calculations in a less equipment-intensive age. There is also an implicit assumption that it will play a crucial role in counter-insurgency operations. If projections are to be made regarding the armed forces, these assumptions will need thorough re-examination within the next 20 years. At the same time, given India's global role, there is a need to expand the Navy and have a sea-based nuclear

There are talks about revolution in military affairs and net-centric warfare, and there have been three to four generational changes in combat equipment, quantum jumps in communication capabilities and introduction of computers.

deterrent. Our Air Force should also match our capabilities as a space power and serve as the most visible form of our conventional deterrent. In addition, India must have its strategic deterrent.

These are the issues that relate to the roles, size, composition, structure, command and control of our armed forces in the period of next 20 years and beyond. Then there is the issue of equipping them with world-class weapons. Here again we face a new situation.

Unlike the Cold War days, the global arms markets are now open for us to pick and choose. At the same time, it should be recognised that armed forces all over the world are shrinking and so are the markets.

The new-generation, sophisticated weapons are pretty expensive and their development and production are concentrated in three areas.


The USA continues to be the pre-eminent weapon developer and producer. It will continue to be so since it is determined to have an armed force which cannot be rivalled by any single nation or a combination of powers. Russia comes next and the European Union remains third. All these three centres are open to India for licensed production and perhaps, in future, for joint R&D and co-production as well. Here again, the concept of strategic partnership becomes meaningful. India has a legitimate ambition of developing an advanced defence R&D capability. It can be done in co-operation with strategic partners even while equipping the Indian forces with world-class equipment.

Then there are the manpower issues that must be put under the scanner. We must be able to recruit the best talents for an equipment-intensive, modern armed force and a career in the forces should be made adequately attractive. Keeping the forces young and providing appropriate career opportunities for those who have to leave are other areas of concern that need to be addressed. The modern combat operations are considered to be triservice operations and the entire training and education programme of the forces have to encompass jointness in all aspects throughout their service careers. That calls for a complete revamping of the training programme in all the three Services.

If India, inheritor of an ancient civilisational legacy, is to play a global role befitting one-sixth of the mankind, should we not be considering these issues in a holistic manner? It is, therefore, necessary to have a high-powered, independent commission under the chairmanship of an eminent apolitical personality to study and prepare a comprehensive report for the Government and the Parliament. The commission should have retired Service chiefs, retired foreign and defence secretaries, eminent industrialists, management specialists and scholars of international relations. It may need a couple of years to complete its task but the outcome of the exercise is bound to create a unique road map for success. **DSA**

The writer served as a Secretary, Defence Production. He also worked as a Convener, National Security Advisory Board, a Chairman, Kargil Review Panel, and a Consulting Editor, Times Of India.





T T T

We cannot completely inhibit crimes against us. However, we can adopt a simple plan of action to reduce the chances of getting victimised. Here are a few do's and don'ts to keep you safe and secure:



1 Vary your routine.

While driving, walking or jogging, always take different routes. Some criminals look for behaviour patterns and same route can make you an easy target.

2 Be alert while walking. Look over your shoulder to see if someone is following. If you think someone is stalking you, just run or call out for help.

3 When walking to your vehicle, have your car keys ready in your hand. Do not wait to get to your vehicle and then start searching for your keys.

4 Park your vehicle in lighted areas and near cameras, if possible. If you feel uncomfortable walking out to your vehicle, ask someone to escort you.

5 When meeting someone for the first time, meet at a public place. Do not divulge your address, phone number or other crucial personal information about yourself in a hurry.

6 Try and avoid deserted streets after dark. If it is unavoidable, then carry a small but heavy

flashlight in your hand. If important, you must take such a route, carry a small, heavy flashlight in your hand.

7 Be careful and alert on dark streets even if you have a companion.

8 Avoid ostentatious jewellery. You can be badly injured if a snatcher yanks a dangle from your ear or a necklace from your neck.

9 Know the local emergency numbers so that you can seek help instantly in case of an emergency.

10 Single and old women should install peep-hole/door chain, and check who is at the door, before they let anyone in.

11 Working women or young girls, who generally travel alone, be aware if a stranger asks to use your phone. Say a firm NO.

12 Single women staying alone should not disclose their residential addresses, cell phone numbers and full official details to strangers or general friends.

13 Single women should always use ATMs during daylight to avoid robbers, who take advantage of dark.

14 Old women pensioners, who feel at risk on pension day while doing bank transactions, should contact their respective banks and arrange banking services at their own convenient timings. Best way for them is to use electronic banking.

15 While waiting for a bus or Metro Link train, if the station is deserted, wait in a well-lit section with your back against the wall if possible.

16 When waiting for an elevator, stand away from the door to avoid being pushed inside by someone near, but unseen.

17 For young girls who stay in college campus, it is good to find out the best route between their hostel, classes and activities. In fact, take the safest route, not the fastest to remain safe.

18 Campus girls should travel in groups at night.

19 Hostellers should never leave a door unlocked for their roommates. Value yourself. Your life and safety are more important than your convenience. **DSA**

Though the Government of India has maintained a stoic silence on the issue, reports are pouring in of the latest Chinese incursion attempts made into Sikkim, thus flouting the 1996 "no firing agreement". If we go by the figures, in 2007 alone, India has recorded well over 140 intrusions by the Chinese troops. The story is no different this year, with the Sikkim being a relatively new feature.

Just at the same time, we hear of a Pakistan based terror group raising its ante in Kashmir, firing five 107 mm rockets across the international border near Amritsar. Is it a coincidence or can these two incidents be linked? Does Bharat Verma's recent prophecy—China attacking India by 2012—has some truth?

Though the latest Chinese moves are indeed ominous and reminiscent of pre-1962 war period, war with China is unlikely.

Apart from India being its largest trading partner, China needs peace in its neighbourhood to claim the top position as the global economic and military power by 2050. China is also acutely aware, that in

a wake up call

The man who once brought the name of China on the map of world's maritime history is Admiral 'Zheng Le'. Today, some 575 years later, China is again gearing up to take sea power seriously and, by 2020, its warships, submarines, merchant ships and fishing trawlers are expected to become frequent visitors to the Pacific and Indian oceans. Before China poses a serious challenge on sea by 2020, India needs to get its act together



the event of a war, its tankers which ferry oil from the Middle East through the narrow choke points of Malacca straits, Sunda and Lombok straits, could be intercepted and destroyed by the Indian Navy. But, Indian Navy can enjoy this qualitative edge only for the next five years. Unless some quick radical changes are made, we will lose this edge between 2015 and 2020.

A war with China (or Pakistan) will become a possibility if we allow our strategic, conventional and counter terror forces to degrade below critical levels. Good conventional and strategic deterrence is the only anti-dote to war.

To counter China, India has to understand its history, geography, technological and scientific abilities. Analyse its industrial base, political will, along with political vision and its seagoing tradition. All of these are essential for any nation to evolve as a sea power and advance its national security.

The history of China suggests that, like India, it relies heavily on sea routes for its global commerce and oil imports from the Middle East. It also has territorial claims involving Taiwan and the various islands in the South China sea.

The man who once brought the name of China on the map of world's maritime history is Admiral 'Zheng Le'. His western voyages are the earliest, and vastest, in marine lore. They employed the largest scale and the most advanced technology in maritime history. Today, few Indians are aware that this legendary figure was accorded a sea burial off Calicut in 1433, while on his seventh sea voyage to the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). He opened the "sea silk route" from China and linked it up with its popular land silk route.

Between 1405 and 1433, he made seven voyages (with 27,000 merchants and sailors) in 317 merchant ships, laden with goods and arms, to the east African coast via Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Malacca straits (where he destroyed 5000 pirates), Sri Lanka, India (Calicut), Iran and Aden. His sailing ships, armed with rockets and cannon, carried goods to ports in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, from where the merchandise joined the existing land silk route to Europe.

Now, some 575 years later, China is again gearing up to take sea power seriously and, by 2020, its warships, submarines, merchant ships and fishing trawlers are expected to become frequent visitors to the Pacific and Indian oceans.

To mark its 60th anniversary, the Chinese Navy (or the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)) held its first-ever

International Fleet Review (IFR) at Qingdao 19-23 April, 2009. Twenty-one ships (including two Indian Navy ships) from 14 countries (including Russia, US, Australia, South Korea, Canada and Pakistan) and delegates from 29 countries (including the Indian Navy Chief) participated in four days of festivities which included functions, seminars, a Sampan race and, on the final day, the fleet parade when Chinese President, Hu Jintao took the review. About 25 Chinese submarines, warships and 31 Chinese naval aircraft also participated. Japan was not invited, presumably due to the atrocities committed by its military during the occupation of China before and during World War II.

This IFR, with participation by major maritime nations, hosted by a rising power like China is important because it showcased China's technological capabilities, its diplomatic clout and its coming-of-age global maritime power to the world. Earlier, China had held only "internal" fleet reviews in 1957, 1995 and 2005.

India too has conducted an IFR in 2001, as also seven IFRs by the President between 1953 and 2005. However, the similarity ends here, since Chinese sea power is evolving in accordance with a national strategy.

Admiral Wu Shengli, the Commander (or Chief) of PLAN who visited India in



**Vice Admiral
Arun Kumar Singh (Retd.)**



2008, must be particularly satisfied as China (after its spectacular Olympics of 2008) not only put up a good display of its growing sea power, but they also had active participation by the Indian Navy. Despite PLAN's conspicuous absence at the IFR in Mumbai in 2001. The Indian IFR was truly a spectacular event, on a much larger scale, with participation from all the continents. Unfortunately, the Chinese gave it a miss because the Pakistani Navy was not invited. Two PLAN warships visited Karachi and Mumbai some four months after the Indian IFR.

The PLAN was founded on April 23, 1949, when nine warships and 17 boats of Kuomintang's Second Coastal Command defected to the PLAN. From this humble beginning, the PLAN, which comprises 2,25,000 officers and sailors till date, has emerged as the world's third largest navy, with about 860 vessels. It consists of mostly home-built ships that range from missile boats to three types of frigates, five types of destroyers, four types of conventional submarines and four types of nuclear submarines (including two types of strategic submarines or SSBNs). The PLAN also has 56,000 Marines, for amphibious operations.

The PLAN has one or two warships on patrol in the Gulf of Aden and is the only Navy to deploy 2,000-km range land based DF-21 ballistic missiles, reportedly capable of attacking American aircraft carriers at sea.

The PLAN, with 77 destroyers and frigates along with 50 conventional submarines, seven SSNs (tactical hunter killer nuclear submarines), three SSBNs (strategic ballistic missile nuclear submarines), 31 mine warfare vessels, 387 fast-attack craft and 84 amphibious ships, is much larger than the Indian Navy. And it will continue to widen the gap with its indigenous production of five types of destroyers, three types of frigates, two types of conventional submarines and two types of nuclear submarines.

Even the air wing of PLAN, called the PLAN Air Force, is almost equal in size to the Indian Air Force. It has some 800 aircraft, including modern fighters like Sukhoi-30, and may soon receive

indigenous J-11 fighters (copy of the Russian Sukhoi-33) for aircraft carrier operations. Its newly constructed Sanya nuclear submarine base on the southern tip of Hainan Island (also a famous tourist resort), took the world by surprise in April 2008.

The world expects the Chinese to put their first aircraft carrier (based on the unfinished hull of 1988 vintage - 65,000 tonne Varyag, which was acquired from Ukraine in 2000) to sea by 2012. Indeed in 2008, ex-Varyag was renamed "Shi Lang", (pennant number 83). Chinese General, Shi Lang had seized Taiwan in 1681. This "training aircraft carrier" is expected to operate about two dozen SU-33 fighter jets, a dozen helicopters, and four Ukrainian designed, locally produced AK-44E carrier borne AEW&C turboprop aircraft (similar to the American Hawk Eye). The AK-44E radar will detect and track up to 120 targets, and have a surveillance range of 350 km against airborne targets. Given the tremendous complexities of carrier operations, the "Shi Lang" would become fully operational and integrated with the Chinese Fleet only after 2020.

The Chinese have also unveiled plans for building two 50,000 tonne conventional aircraft carriers and a 65,000 tonne nuclear powered aircraft carrier by 2020. These will presumably operate the Chinese reverse engineered copy of the SU-27/ SU-33 fighter jet, known as J-11 and AK-44E AEW&C. China is also expected, by 2020, to have a newer SSBN of 15000 tons, capable of carrying 24 nuclear tipped JL-2 missiles (the Jin class is 8000 tons and carries twelve JL-2 missiles with a range of 8000 km).

Unlike India, the Chinese political-bureaucratic-military leadership have understood sea power. China today not only produces warships and submarines, but also boasts of about 492 yards for shipbuilding/repairs (India has 28), which employs 287,702 workers (India has 50,000), and produces 20 per cent of the global merchant shipping tonnage (India produces a dismal 0.8 per cent). Also, Chinese yards contribute 84 per cent of indigenous ships to Chinese domestic shipping (Indian yards contribute only two per cent since it is cheaper to import ships). In addition, shipbuilding manhours per tonne in China is 80, while in India it is 200 (in Japan and South Korea, it is 10 manhours per tonne).

Any forecasts that communist China may collapse, like the former USSR, are unlikely to materialise. Because unlike the USSR which went bankrupt, what with 60 per cent of its gross domestic product



spent on defence, China is also a great economic power with a three trillion USD economy; equal to Germany and still growing. Our economy is about one-third of China's and is also on a growth path. We need not match China's navy—ship for ship, but should have enough to deal with what China can deploy in the IOR.

By 2020, the Chinese Navy would still be inferior to the US Navy in terms of technology and capability. But, it would have a substantial sea control-cum-sea denial and second strike capability. That would be based on four aircraft carriers, a dozen nuclear submarines of the SSBN and SSN types, a hundred modern conventional submarines, and similar numbers of destroyers and frigates. It may not have a capability for global expeditionary warfare like the US Navy, but it would have a very strong regional amphibious warfare capability to press its claims on Taiwan and the other islands in the South China sea.

More ominously for India, Chinese carrier battle groups (CBGs) and attack nuclear submarines (SSNs) would commence prolonged deployments in the large expanses of the IOR.

Chinese shipyards will produce even more merchant ships and fishing trawlers, which will venture further out to sea. Indeed, I expect Chinese fishing trawlers to begin "harvesting" fish in the pristine waters of the Andaman sea by 2020, thus raising fresh problems for India. At present, the odd Taiwanese, Thai, Myanmar and Indonesian trawlers are apprehended by the Indian Coast Guard, for poaching in our Exclusive Economic one (EE) of the Andaman & Nicobar islands. But, this problem will aggravate, when the Chinese trawlers arrive in strength. Today China, with a catch of 22 million tons of fish

is the world's leading fishing nation, while India is third with a catch of only eight million tons. This catch can be increased, if India concentrates on the rich fishing grounds of the Andaman sea, which have only 3,000 Indian fishing boats, compared to over three lakh boats operating off our eastern and western coasts. Further, trawlers are also useful craft for intelligence gathering as proved during the cold war era.

By 2020, India will face a challenge at sea which will be similar to the numerous Chinese border incursions. This challenge will be, in addition to the requirement of countering Pakistani based coastal terror attacks like 26/11, the need to carry out anti-piracy patrols in the distant waters off Aden and Mauritius.

Since 1947, India has generally ignored national security, sea power and coastal security. Due to which, it has faced numerous tactical surprises from Pakistan and China, with Mumbai's recent terror attack being the latest example. This time we need to get our act together and prepare for the coming challenges well before 2020, since our national prosperity and security is completely linked to sea power. Around 90 per cent of our trade and 100 per cent of the oil imports are being moved by merchant ships. Apart from the obvious requirements of trained manpower and hardware (warships, submarines, coast guard, marine police, harbour police, merchant ships, trawlers, ports, offshore oil rigs) and a common digital databank and datalink, we also need a single point professional National Maritime Advisor. **DSA**

The writer retired as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, of the Eastern Naval Command, Vishakapatnam.

know your forces



The officer ranks of our Indian army by and large match with those of Western militaries, and are a replica of British military ranks. However, traditional British names for ranks are still being used in India, along with the western names for those respective ranks.

I) Field Marshal



Field marshal is an honorary rank. It does not exist in present army organization structure; however two distinguished officers of the Indian armed forces

have been conferred with the rank. They are: late Sam Manekshaw and late K.M. Cariappa. Field Marshals do not retire and the rank is for life.

II) General




Gold national emblem and star outlined in red over a crossed gold baton and scimitar

III) Lieutenant General



Gold national emblem outlined in red over a crossed baton and scimitar

IV) Major General



Gold star outlined in red over a crossed gold baton and scimitar

V) Brigadier



Gold national emblem over three gold stars in a triangle formation

VI) Colonel



Gold national emblem over two gold stars

VII) Lieutenant Colonel



Gold national emblem over one gold star

VIII) Major



Gold national emblem

XI) Captain



Three gold stars

X) Lieutenant



Two gold stars

Junior Commissioned Officers

Subedar Major / Risaldar Major

Gold national emblem with strip

Subedar / Risaldar

Two gold stars with strip

Naib Subedar / Naib Risaldar


One gold star with strip

Non Commissioned Officers

- Battalion Havildar Major / Regimental Daffadar Major
- Battalion Quarter Master Havildar / Regimental Quarter Master Daffadar
- Company Havildar Major / Squadron Daffadar Major
- Company Quarter Master Havildar / Squadron Quarter Master Daffadar

- Havildar / Daffadar
- Naik / Lance Daffadar
- Lance Naik / Acting Lance Daffadar
- Sepoy / Sowar

owning your



destiny: network-centric warfare


Oren Barkai



The ability to protect the country or go offensive when required depends on real-time access to vital information—achieved through the convergence of diverse communication structures across the land, air and sea. It is the new-millennium network-centric warfare (NCW), a key differentiator when it comes to strategic decision-making and military success. Just like the big guns across the world, should we also go ahead and develop NCW capability? Here's a close look at what it offers...

On the night of November 26, 2008, 10 heavily-armed terrorists reached the shores of Mumbai and carried out well-coordinated attacks in India's financial capital. Nearly 200 people were killed and hundreds were injured as the nation reeled under the shock and India was made painfully aware that it must spruce up its defence infrastructure further and that too, without delay. For countries like India, and even for the most advanced defence forces across the world, local insurgents and acts of terrorism continue to pose a major challenge.

In an age when military affairs have undergone revolutionary changes, countries like India are increasing their efforts to catch up with the high-tech capabilities of militaries around the world. Although India has emerged as a civilian IT power, this segment is yet to be fully exploited for national security and defence purposes. It



is required, nonetheless, since a vast amount of data, voice and video must be transported and shared to give troops a complete picture of any specific battle. Any break in these communication links is bound to put the Indian defence forces in major difficulties and thus jeopardise crucial military operations.

In the aftermath of Mumbai terror attacks, India has realised the importance of communication infrastructure as an integral component of military strength. The country now has the option to look to other nations facing similar challenges and gain insight into improving its military infrastructure.

Israel as a guide to top technology

Israel has been facing terrorist threats for decades and more than 60 years of direct conflicts with its neighbouring countries have taught the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) that owning, operating and updating communication infrastructure is immensely crucial. Every military faces the painful reality that it is cheaper, easier and faster to bring down an army's communication network than to fight it. In other words, "An army that cannot talk, cannot move. An army that cannot move, cannot fight."

The IDF as well as many other leading military forces, have, therefore, opted to own and operate their own communication networks rather than depending on civilian operators' infrastructure. These militaries are able to design, plan and protect their infrastructure to handle the capacity, flexibility and security key to their defence operations. As a result, an army's communication capabilities have become crucial to a successful military agenda, which leads governments to apply a network-centric warfare (NCW) doctrine as an integral part of their military might. In

addition, the IDF has gone a long way in building its own cellular network (known as "Mountain Rose") and WiMax network (known as "Broad Channel").

What is network-centric warfare (NCW)?

Pioneered by the US Department of Defense, network-centric warfare relies on computer processing power and networking communications technology to provide shared information of the battle space among armed forces. This increases synergy for command and control, resulting in superior decision-making, and the ability to coordinate complex military operations over long distances for an overwhelming war-fighting advantage.

With ability to provide real-time evaluation of the battlefield, NCW infrastructure is built to handle a rapid move from routine communication activities to wartime operations, requiring flexibility, scalability and redundancy.

A case in point was the Second Lebanon War in July 2006, when the IDF had to rapidly transport and gather troops to protect the country's northern border. It became clear that rapid and effective communication was the top priority with two main requirements high bandwidth and redundancy. The army's communication network had to be upgraded quickly while under constant artillery attacks. Within hours, mobile communication units—operating in exactly the same way as fixed sites—were moved to the required areas and received instant connectivity based on "point-and-click" allocations. The use of the fixed COTS-based wireless networks was done in the same way. This unique capability contributed greatly to the army's field superiority throughout the 34-day conflict.

Implementing NCW: Pros and cons

India can learn a great deal from Israel in this respect. Although the terror situations in both countries are not similar, the impact remains the same. India needs to adopt NCW, but this move will require flexibility, scalability and redundancy.

The first priority in implementing NCW is connectivity or bandwidth. A robust NCW communication infrastructure must be able to support and transport a

vast amount of voice, data and video-based services so that decision-makers are able to have a complete picture of the battlefield in real time.

Secondly, there is redundancy. In the civilian sector, a network failure may cause inconvenience and monetary loss in most cases. In the case of military and defense corps, the slightest system downtime may result into a national security threat—an intolerable reality. The industry benchmark of "five nines" for network reliability, which is usually acceptable for non-military service providers, is not reliable enough for an organisation that demands "always up and running" systems.

Flexibility is another necessity, as the information transmitted must keep up with the rapidly changing battle realities and manoeuvring forces. Wireless is not the

struggling to keep them alive and working together, in order to utilise them for newer, more advanced services.

As the Indian defence forces transform into an advanced military power, in terms of both strength as well as technologically advanced machinery, communication and networking infrastructure (both wireline and wireless) will become a top priority. Subsequently, the country will have to look for telecommunications companies with vast experience in worldwide military operations and capability of building a reliable NCW infrastructure.

These telecom companies must be capable of developing leading technological solutions, with an overall approach to building NCW architecture that guarantees the high-level of expertise

An army's communication capabilities have become crucial to a successful military agenda, which leads governments to apply a network-centric warfare (NCW) doctrine as an integral part of their military might.

only issue in this case, as wireline flexibility is mandatory to allow the information flows to stationary bases. One may argue that flexibility is also important in civilian telecom scenarios. However, no operator has ever prepared itself for a scenario in which an entire city moves from one side of the country to the other. The level of flexibility demanded in the defence sector is significantly higher.

Another important aspect is, of course, cost-effectiveness. The task of building a converged infrastructure for communication applications is not a new practice. The first converged infrastructure was based on several distinct platforms. The idea of building a converged infrastructure has risen from the capital expenses fiascos of building multiple infrastructure systems per service and then

necessary for the provision of optimal infrastructure. The foundation of this architecture rests not only on telecom vendor platforms, but also on third-party, best-of-breed interoperable products that come together to form an ideal NCW infrastructure solution.

Only then will these militaries and indeed, these countries, be able to operate at maximum efficiency to protect their citizens from terror attacks. **USA**

The writer is a Director, Government & Defense Solutions, at ECI Telecom headquartered in Israel. He holds an MBA degree from the Technion Israel Institute of Technology, and a B.Sc. degree in electrical engineering from Tel Aviv University. He also served as a Major in the Israeli Defense Forces Signals Corps, and has a decade of experience in military networks and security.

India's communication infrastructure is dependent on civilian operators. The Achilles' heel of any such network is that it is built for revenue. Military networks should be built for crisis.

whither now, LTTE?

After decades of armed offensive and bloody encounters, it seems that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has lost its final battle—fought to the bitter end. Velupillai Prabhakaran and most of his key associates are dead. And the mysterious arrest of its newly elected leader has dealt another body blow to the rest of the Tamil rebels desperately trying to regroup. But is it truly the end of the road for LTTE? Or will it rise again from the ashes for a lost cause and stun its arch-enemies? A review...

V. Balachandran



It would have been possible for the Sri Lankan intelligence to nab KP alias Selvarasa Pathmanathan alias Kumaran Padmanabhan alias Kutty in September, 2007, from Thailand but for an indiscreet prior claim by Colombo which alerted KP's high-level contacts in that country. Thus on September 12, 2007, when Sri Lankan and Indian diplomats quizzed the Thai interior ministry about KP's reported arrest, police spokesman Lt. Gen. Ronnarong ounyuven spoofed. After denying KP's arrest, he diverted the subject and revealed that three Tamil Tigers, who were arrested four years ago from the southern coastal province of Ranong for gun-running, had been handed over to Sri Lanka in August after their jail term came to an end.

The Thai police must have known that KP was living in the country under a fake identity after marrying a Thai woman who had worked in his "cover" export firm Palmax in Bangkok. But KP could not have been so easily apprehended on August 5-6, 2009, had he not been brazen and overconfident about his security by giving a high profile interview to British Channel-4, aired on July 24-25. For some reason or the other, this interview was not reported in the



KP alias Selvarasa Pathmanathan took over as new LTTE Chief



www.godesi.com

Indian media. However, it had upset Colombo to a great extent.

This writer watched the interview which was claimed to have been shot in a "hidden location". It began by saying that KP, who had never been interviewed earlier, had 23 passports. He was wearing a golf cap, dark glasses and sporting a beard, but did not look into the camera. It also featured a Spartan office or residential premises somewhere in south or south-east Asia and KP was seen walking through the corridors. Even shots of the airport were taken and displayed. The camera recorded KP's profile throughout as he claimed that there were still 1500-2000 cadres holed up in the Sri Lankan jungles. "We silenced the guns," he announced dramatically. "They have accepted my leadership. They are waiting for my next instructions."

Regarding India he said "We firmly believe that India would realise its importance one day and support the Tamil Eelam's struggle for self-determination." He added that he would "initiate direct contact" with New Delhi.

Sri Lankan and Indian intelligence personnel have been separately tracking KP's movements for years. They had a fairly good idea of his hideouts but logistical problems and local support prevented his apprehension. It needed no superior intelligence to connect Channel 4 visuals to his known hideouts in Thailand or other South-East Asian countries and zoom on

him after the interview. In fact, after watching the interview, an overseas Tamil identifying himself as Kumar recorded in a blog on July 24 that KP appeared to be in Malaysia. KP also underestimated, the Sri Lankan intelligence had transformed itself into a highly efficient outfit just like their army. The decimation of the LTTE leadership in Sri Lanka and the consequent demoralisation of its overseas supporters made it easier for the Lankan intelligence to obtain local co-operation this time. So KP was lifted from Thailand or Malaysia in what is called a "Black flight". The US intelligence terms these flights as "rendition".

What defanged Tamil Tigers?

But would this be the end of the surviving charismatic LTTE leadership? To study this, we need to go to the basic support base among the overseas Sri Lankan Tamils. The diaspora, which was already present in several countries, was further strengthened by nearly 800,000 people who fled after the 1983 civil disturbances. Presently, the largest base is Canada with a 400,000-strong Tamilian support. Most of them are educated and skilled, and the majority belongs to the 14-28 age group. However, the LTTE's hold over this segment began to wane when Col. Karuna of the eastern

faction broke away in March, 2004. The diaspora did split up then over regional or even caste lines.

This was not the only reason for LTTE's weakening. The entire outfit was very tired of the never-ending violence. Prabhakaran's paranoia about his safety and leadership made him extremely suspicious of his own associates—leading to a Byzantine roller-coaster leadership style. What's more, some associates fed him with stories to incite his suspicion. The step-by-step dethronement of his erstwhile confidantes started with Mathaya who was executed on 28th December, 1994, after being branded as an Indian spy. And after each such incident, the overseas followers of the executed leaders had to realign themselves.

There are also reliable stories of Prabhakaran's differences with Kittu (Sathasivam Krishnakumar) who committed suicide when his ship M.V. Ahat was surrounded by Indian Navy on 13th January, 1993. Kittu had stayed abroad due to his differences with the LTTE supremo. A senior LTTE ideologue from abroad had revealed in 1993 that Prabhakaran wanted to eliminate Kittu but did not want to be responsible for his death. He had, therefore, fed the information to Indian authorities about Kittu's movements as he knew that Kittu would commit suicide if intercepted.

Similarly, Prabhakaran's police "arrested" his international spokesmen

That was the beginning of the LTTE's downfall since Tamilselvan's parallel procurement machinery was penetrated by the Sri Lankan intelligence.

Also, arms were not forthcoming since Tamilselvan's teams could not replicate KP's smooth network. But, Prabhakaran realised his folly only too late.

Lawrence Thilagar (based in Paris) and Murali (based in Switzerland) on July 29, 1998, for misappropriation of funds and killing of Perimbanathan, the financial secretary of LTTE in Paris. They were reportedly taken to Jaffna in an LTTE ship where Prabhakaran was to decide their fate. It is generally believed that Thilagar is dead. But on March 30, 2009, a person identifying himself as Lawrence Christy has written a blog—On the spot report from LTTE controlled territory in Wanni. The writer claims that his nom de guerre (pseudonym) is Thilagar and he is based in Paris. These leadership convulsions have certainly divided the diaspora and weakened LTTE in the long run.

D.B.S. Jeyaraj, a well-known journalist and commentator on LTTE, whose showdown with Thilagar marked a milestone in his reporting career, said that the same thing happened to KP as well. A pass-out from Madras Christian College, Jeyaraj used to write for *The Hindu* and his in-depth understanding of the Indian and the Sri Lankan situations was well-received. But his "plain-speaking" in print—first for *Senthamarai*, a Toronto weekly, and then for his own Tamil weekly *Muncharie* (also published from Toronto) drew the wrath of the LTTE goons. More violence and a series of well-planned attacks by LTTE supporters finally led to the closure of the publication in 1996.

After the 2002 ceasefire, S.P. Tamilselvan, head of the LTTE's political wing (who was killed in a precision air attack on November 2, 2007) had incited Prabhakaran against KP, although the latter was closest to him and was the only leader

to have attended his wedding. Prabhakaran then removed KP from the worldwide arms procurement responsibility.

According to Jeyaraj, that was the beginning of the LTTE's downfall since Tamilselvan's parallel procurement machinery was penetrated by the Sri Lankan intelligence. Also, arms were not forthcoming since Tamilselvan's teams could not replicate KP's smooth network. But Prabhakaran realised his folly only too late. He asked Soosai to win over the sulking KP and resume leadership, but the parallel wing would not co-operate.

In January, 2009, KP was put in charge of the international relations department but Castro, who was then looking after that job, refused to co-operate. KP's strategy was to arrange international demonstrations to highlight the trapped civilian casualties and bring pressure from Western governments on Colombo to end War. But Castro thwarted this move by arranging all demonstrations in the name of Prabhakaran and LTTE which did not impress western governments.

The Castro-Nediyavan group opposed KP's initiatives and alleged that KP was won over by Colombo. Tamil Nadu's pro-LTTE groups led by Nedumaran and Vaiko also criticised KP. Finally, an agreement was reached between KP and Nediyavan on July 20, 2009, whereby an executive committee co-chaired by Col. Suresh (from Mannar) and Col. Ram (from Amparai) was constituted, KP was named the secretary general and Nediyavan was put in charge of diaspora affairs. However, the LTTE mouthpieces like the *Tamil Net* (edited by Jeyachandran in Norway and Sreetharan in

the USA), *Pathivu* (edited by Vaageesan in Geneva) and *Sangathi* (edited by Aathithan in France) were all against KP.

Jeyaraj, however, says that the overseas LTTE structure is still strong despite the factional struggle. But the leadership in post-Prabhakaran or post-KP era might present a problem. He also feels, LTTE continues to enjoy significant support and influence among the Tamil diaspora. The "Sea Tiger" modules installed in foreign countries for procurement of arms are intact and loyal to KP. Similarly, the overseas intelligence wing under K. Arivazhagan is also loyal to KP. According to the scribe, Col. Suresh and Col. Ram accepted his leadership as well. KP's strategies were to project a peaceful struggle, gain time and rebuild the LTTE's infrastructure, which seem to have lost steam after his arrest.

The road ahead

So what are the options for LTTE? There is no doubt that the rump locked in Sri Lanka will be unable to carry on any struggle for Tamils unless they come back to the parliamentary path. However, LTTE's success was achieved via terror tactics and not through peaceful means, so the ballot bailout can hardly be its preferred option.

The existing Tamil groups or LTTE renegades like Col. Karuna would not accept the outfit's individuality and will definitely insist on identity merging. Would the overseas diaspora leadership unite under any other leader, now that KP is arrested? Would a peaceful struggle be acceptable to the vast majority of restless youths staying abroad? Or would they emulate the Armenian terrorist groups who had been extradited from Turkey after a mass genocide in 1915 but managed to resurface in several countries in 1973? Those terror outfits had carried out 200 deadly attacks on Turkish targets and killed 71 individuals, mostly diplomats, in 19 countries till they were overcome in 1986. It is, therefore, very difficult to predict what the future holds. However, a lot depends on President Mahinda Rajapaksa who must ensure that unlike his predecessors, his promises to the Lankan Tamils are not just empty words and can be implemented without further delay. **DSA**

The writer is a former Special Secretary of the Cabinet Secretariat. He was also a part of the high level committee appointed by the Maharashtra government to inquire into 26/11 terror attacks.



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“The moment which is close to my heart is when we became the first-ever husband and wife team to be honoured with the Vishisht Seva Medal (VSM), at the same defence investiture ceremony by the President”



A key player in revolutionising the position and prominence of women in the Indian armed forces, Air Marshal **Padmavathy Bandhopadhyay** in a candid interview with *Puja Raina Mahaldar* -

Q Wasn't it a bold career choice in the 60's to join the IAF? What actually did inspire you?

es, undoubtedly it was a very bold career choice at that time, especially when you have to win over and satisfy your family members that you want to join armed forces. When I made up my mind to enrol for the armed forces and serve the nation, the main influence behind this step was the 1962 (Indo-China) war. Young boys whom I had played with and had seen every day, jumping and popping around my colony and nearby areas, suddenly disappeared. They were sent to high altitudes to save the country and they never came back. It was a horrible war. This war made me reflect and I finally decided to join Armed forces.

Q Tell us about your childhood. Was it any different from other children? Did your parents support you in your career choice?

My childhood was like any other girl child of that time. I used to live with my parents in Delhi and was doing my pre-medical from Kirorimal College. I was a total civilian-sight of armed forces, war, dying people, these kinds of things, or even thoughts, used to scare me like any other child. But then, this brutal war happened, many of my close friends and classmates never returned. This brutal war changed me totally. And, I decided to join the armed forces. Fortunately, AFMC opened at the same time and I was somehow able to achieve what I had aspired to just because of my father's support. My mother, till I had cleared, did not know that I was joining AFMC so as to join the armed forces! She was simply informed that I had joined some medical college in Pune.

Q Why didn't you join a full-fledged flying career? Do you feel that a medical career in the IAF has been as fulfilling as that of a pilot?

When I decided to join IAF, at that time women candidates were not allowed to



specialty which combines aspects of preventive, occupational, environmental and clinical medicine with the physiology and psychology of man in flight. It is concerned with the health and safety of those who fly, and those that are crew as well as passengers.

A lot of research has been done in this field in my working career. When I started my career, fighter planes were just single seater, then came subsonic, supersonic, and now we have multi-seater fighter planes as well. So, a lot of research till now has been done to study the life style of pilots—how two / more people will react while flying a fighter plane, how they will manage the plane and all the activities inside the

plane etc. Earlier, the duration of flight was also less, for example—at the onset of my career, it was just 40 minutes, and just imagine now we can fly for 24 hours at a stretch. So, a lot of research has been done in this area as well as what are the physiological reactions of pilots who fly for so long, what are his daily activities that he can manage in-flight and what are the interaction aspects of a pilot who fly for such a long duration, hypoxia, g-forces, what kind of food he likes to take and what is safe food for pilots, etc.

Q Are you the only Indian woman who has made it to the Arctic? Tell us more about the research expedition and your findings?

es! In the armed forces. I am the only woman who has been to the Arctic. Regarding any other women, even civilian, I really don't have any idea.

In the late 1980s, I went off to the Arctic to join an Indo-Russian physiology experiment to uncover whether people from tropical Indian climates could acclimatise themselves to extreme cold conditions. At that time, I was with the Defence Institute of Physiology and Allied Sciences, and we spent almost four months at the North Pole between November 1989 and February 1990. Our research proved that Indians could acclimatise themselves to extreme conditions.

enter the flying stream. So we, at that time, did not have much option or choice, other than serving the country as doctors in armed forces.

es, absolutely! Medical career is as fulfilling as any other career. My basic motto to join armed forces was to serve the nation. And, I served the nation by serving Jawans and officers, and making them fit to fight back as soon as possible.

Q What is Aviation Medicine? Tell us about the extensive research you have done in this field?

Aviation Medicine is a medical

Q You have many firsts against your name in a long career with IAF. Can you share it with our readers and out of all these, which one is the most glorious moment of your professional life?

- First woman Air Marshal of India
- First woman officer as an aviation medicine specialist in India
- First woman officer of the Indian Air Force to be promoted to the rank of Air Vice Marshal
- First woman Fellow of the Aerospace Medical Society of India
- First Indian woman to have conducted scientific research at the North Pole
- First-ever husband and wife team till date to be honoured with the Vishisht Seva Medal (VSM) at the same defence investiture ceremony by the President.

All of them are glorious moments of my life. However, the moment which is close to my heart is when we became the first-ever husband and wife team to be honoured with the Vishisht Seva Medal (VSM), at the same defence investiture ceremony by the President. The foremost reason why this moment is close to my heart is, this is the first recognition that I received, that too with my husband, at the onset of our careers when we both were very young. So, the thrill, excitement and memories associated with this award are much more than other recognitions.

During the 1971 (India-Pakistan) war, I was just a flying officer out of the IAF Command Hospital in Bangalore. I was posted along with my husband, Wing Commander (retd.) S.N. Bandhopadhyay, at the Halwara airbase in Punjab. As soon as the conflict started, we had to deal with a lot of casualties and by the time the special surgical team from Bangalore arrived war was almost over. I had to perform many life-saving operations and this is the phase where I learnt a lot. For our contributions to the war effort, me and my husband, an

administrative officer, were awarded the VSM; an award which is given for exemplary devotion to duty.

Q What are the worst moments associated with your career that you want to forget?



I want to forget most of the moments when I was not supported, just because I was a women officer. Many a time, during my working career, I was given an excuse "We have done this because we have tried to place you along with your husband".

The worst moment, that punches my heart till date, is when I joined as a Director General (DG). I read a note by an ex-DG, (whose name I would not like to give) saying "The percentage of women in IAF is more than the other armed forces and that they are striving hard these days". For what To become DG—No way!

Q Do you think Indian women should be awarded a permanent commission and combat posts?

es, I strongly agree that permanent commission, should be awarded to women

in the armed forces. For awarding this commission, there should be some criteria. And, if women officers clear them, why should they not be given. If the gender is the only reason, this is not the valid reason.

However as far as combat posts are concerned, instead of demanding, first of all we should question ourselves—whether we are mentally tuned for combat forces, how are you going to crack the social milieu, when we have a society that is all concerned about when a girl is going to be married. Are your families going to support the decision. If all the answers to these questions are positive, and all those around you are supportive, you start demanding. We all know, it's going to come in the near future—may be, not for us but for the coming generations.


Q How did you manage to juggle the work-life combo? Was it stressful at times?

When you choose to come out and work, you have to manage this work-life combo. This can only be managed when your whole family supports your cause and mission. Many a times, it becomes stressful but your dedication to work, to achieve, and family support removes all the stresses.

Q Do you think that behind every successful woman, there is a man? If so, who is that man in your life?

Behind every successful woman, there can be woman as well (She laughs it off). However I always had a man to support me—from the onset of my career, and now as well.

At the beginning of my career, my father supported my decision to join the armed forces. I got special support from my father, when my mother out-rightly refused to allow even my brother to join the armed forces in the 1962 war. After marriage, my husband Wing Commander (retd.) S.N. Bandhopadhyay has supported me a lot and is supporting me till date. He has been a guiding force behind me to reach this level. **DSA**



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voyage to terrorism

Dr. Rakhee Bhattacharya

The cross-country connection and functioning mechanism of modern terrorism is, perhaps, better understood when a joint effort is made by think tanks across the globe. The book titled *Terrorism Patterns of Internationalization* is a unique example of this. Edited by two internationally acclaimed terrorism analysts from two corners of the world and written by people from various parts of the world, the book brings to readers a never-before approach to terrorism.

One of India's most prominent terrorism and security experts, Jaideep Saikia hails from one of the worst terrorist-affected regions of the north-east. His earlier analyses and writings have drawn global attention and gained much respect in the Indian security circle. Ekaterina Stepanova from Russia is a senior research associate of International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm. And the two have put together their honest endeavours to compile a volume on modern terrorism and its mode of internationalisation.

The book has conceptualised and contextualised terrorism within an international canvas and also broken the monotony of stereotyped narration of terrorist activities and their crimes against humanity as isolated case studies. It has explained why and how terrorism has turned transnational and how skilled and capable it is to destabilise global security. Along with a very logical and sequential

introduction by Jaideep and Ekaterina, 11 other prominent contributors have enriched this volume for world security studies. The understanding and analyses of these essays have revealed a strong contour of modern terrorism that goes beyond mere quantitative anthology of number of attacks, causalities, incidents etc. and maps an intertwined global networking of various militant groups. Such attempt needs to be appreciated since the post 9/11 scenario has altogether transformed the minds and vision of global citizens when it comes to terrorism and its ever-expanding powers and potentials.

The book takes its readers on an incredible voyage across the world to witness how underground militants are uniting and co-ordinating to destroy the beauty and innocence of the world. The first six essays reveal the international connection of domestic terror ruling the roost in countries and

continents like Europe, Latin America, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and India (especially Kashmir). The next three essays analyse the modern manifestation of terrorism and its powerful international links in places like India's north-east and Asia's Middle East, as well as in South-East Asian countries. The last two essays bring in light the international networking of Islamist movements through organisations like the Al-Qaeda.

It is essential to understand the ideological movements of such organisations in order to correlate to the functioning of modern terrorism. The pan-Islamic network, with its radical and religious identity and agenda, manifests conflicts and violence at the global level. Such groups have acquired unlimited means like CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) weapons, which have the potentials to destroy

the world with unconventional "super terrorist" attacks. Although the findings show that terrorists have only limited capacity to initiate such unconventional attacks, one cannot rule out the severe challenge that these weapons pose to humanity.

However, the book could have won more accolades if there were a holistic approach towards terrorism—a cult firmly interlinked with political, economic, cultural and socio-religious frameworks. The 9/11 tragedy and subsequent events of similar nature across the globe calls for an integrated approach towards this critical issue, seen as a complex mix of international politics, funding chains, division and deprivation and a strong religious polarisation across the world. Such an attempt, therefore, might have led us towards the roots and causes resulting in such mushrooming growth and connective capacity of modern terrorism.

Barring this issue, the volume certainly deserves applause for providing the readers with rich source materials on the nature of modern terrorism and the way it is getting globalised. The book's usefulness stems from its sound analysis and robust theoretical framework, which will surely serve as a definitive reference for security studies. **DSA**

Terrorism: Patterns of Internationalization


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About the reviewer

The reviewer is an Economist and a Fellow of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, Kolkata. Her areas of interest are India's North-East, its security and development perspective, as well as

India's regional economic co-operation with South-East Asian countries. Her publications span a diverse range of topics including development, disparity, poverty, regional economies and economy of insurgency.

Big Steps

During a practical exercise at a military police base, the instructor was giving the class instruction in unarmed self-defense.

After he presented a number of different situations in which they might find themselves, he asked a student, "What steps would you take if someone were coming at you with a large, sharp knife?"

The student replied, "Big ones!"

Just a Little Help

The cavalryman was galloping down the road, rushing to catch up with his regiment. Suddenly, his horse stumbled and pitched him to the ground. Lying in the dirt with a broken leg, terrified of the approaching enemy, the soldier called out, "All you saints in heaven, help me get up on my horse!"


Then, with superhuman effort, he leaped onto the horse's back and fell off the other side. Once again on the ground, he called to the heavens, "All right, just half of you this time!"

Who Goes There?

Soldier who was on sentry duty was taken to the military hospital because he was suffering from chronic constipation.

When a visitor knocked on the door of his ward, he shouted, 'Who goes there? Friend or enemy?'

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
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*The power of a king lies in his mighty arms ...
Security of the citizens at peace time is very
important because State is the only saviour of
the men and women who get affected only
because of the negligence of the State.*

—Chanakya

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warmest regards,

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