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INDO-PAK War 1965

Battle of ASAL UTTAR

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Despite heavy enemy fire for long spells, Lt Col Caleb exercised his command with calmness and fortitude and inspired his officers and men to fight against the enemy fearlessly. In this action 15 enemy Patton tanks were destroyed and nine others which were in good working condition were captured. His cool courage, leadership and foresight contributed greatly to this outstanding success.

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The INDO-PAK War of 1965 by Gen S Roychowdhury PVSM, AVSM (retd)

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in the opinion of some, the 1965 indo-Pak War was a pointless stalemate. Others feel that India achieved its strategic aims by breaking the taboo on crossing international borders and established a historical precedent for strategic decision-making which paid rich dividends in 1971. The master sequence can be said to have been initiated almost from 1963 onwards, on a staggered dateline commencing with the Moe-e-Muqaddas riots in Srinagar in 1963 with the ultimate finale at the Tashkent Declaration on 10 January 1966.

 

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The Elusive CDS by Air Chief Marshal PV Naik PVSM, VSM (retd)

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More than a decade after Kargil Group of Ministers’ recommendations, many of the decisions with the exception of the most crucial one ─ that of the appointment of a CDS ─ have been implemented. the CDS envisaged as a single-point military adviser continues to remain elusive mainly because there is no political or military consensus and the bureaucracy is happy to play along.

 

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State Of The Two Armies by Lt Gen Satish nambiar PVSM, AVSM, VRC (retd)

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Though the outcome of the 1965 War cannot be considered an outright victory for the indian Armed forces, it went a long way in restoring the pride, confidence and self-esteem of the forces that had taken a battering in 1962. It also restored the image of the forces in the eyes of the general public. As a consequence, indian Army units responded with added determination to the provocations along the Ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir in later years, at nathu la Pass in 1967, in securing the outstanding victory in 1971, at Sumdorong chu in 1987 and most recently during the Kargil operations.

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Jammu & Kashmir - The Bone of Contention by Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SM, VSM & BAr (retd)

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the one major lesson which must go down for posterity with the indian security establishment is the fact that Pakistan was, is and will always remain obsessed with J&K. Its acts to initiate and secure a military advantage will never be dictated by a sense of rationale and deniability is something it has mastered. The irrational is something that we can always expect which makes the task of defence of J&K that much more challenging.

 

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1965 War With Pakistan by Lt Gen Harwant Singh PVSM, AVSM (retd)

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We have learned no lessons from history, old and more recent. Now when Pakistan is arming itself with chinese and russian military equipment and china has been busy building military infrastructure in Tibet, India appears to be in no better state than that of 1962 period. Though we are now faced with the prospects of a two-front war.

 

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INDO-PAK War 1965 Role of Indian Air Force

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Air commodore PM Wilson, a distinguished iAf bomber pilot, encapsulated his assessment of the air operations as follows: ‘My impression about all air force operation whether east or west was that nobody seemed to know what to do. The lessons learned in 1965 were all negative ones; in other words, what not to do, should there be another conflict. These lessons were so numerous and so cogent that they were more valuable than any positive lessons’.

 

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Ayub's Miscalculation by Maj Gen ian cardozo AVSM, SM (retd)

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Although many have termed the result of the 1965 War with Pakistan as a stalemate, it would be more appropriate to say that it was Pakistan that lost the war. Pakistan failed miserably once again in her aim of annexing Jammu and Kashmir by force although all factors were in her favour. On the contrary, it resulted in the near total destruction of one of her armoured divisions.

 

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Pakistan Misses A Trick Operation Grand Slam by Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch SM, VSM (retd)

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Among the many reasons proffered for the change in command, three have some semblance of credibility. One explanation was that Yahya was a close friend of Ayub and with the fall of Akhnoor imminent, he lobbied with Ayub to give him command and Ayub obliged to help an old friend. Another reason that has been proffered was that Malik belonged to the Ahmadiyya sect and Ayub did not want an Ahmadiyya to become a war hero. Both these theories while possible, appear unlikely. Perhaps the change had something to do with Ayub’s belief that the capture of Akhnoor would lead to a general war with india – a possibility that he wished to avoid. Why then did Ayub sanction the operation if he feared such a possibility? the reasons for the change will perhaps remain an enigma.

 

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1965 - A Tribute to Courage And Resoluteness by Brig Rahul K Bhonsle (retd)

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today our national goal remains that of securing economic growth and development. This precludes strategic offensive and it is generally perceived that the nation will not go to war unless it is forced to. This is evident from the operational tasks assigned to the indian Armed Forces as are evident in discussions in the open domain. The three Services are required to be prepared for a war to dominate Pakistan and deter China. Thus a two-front war scenario is realistically appraised and in both the cases strategic defensive remains the primary option with variation for a more robust posture to ‘dominate’ Pakistan.

 

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The Indian Navy And The INDO-PAK War of 1965

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After China’s attack on India’s northern frontiers in 1962, the Army’s hands were more than full and the Indian Navy had been charged with the garrisoning of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Commencing 1964 onwards, Indonesia’s stance was markedly pro-Pakistan.

 

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INDO-PAK War 1965 Reflections by Lt Gen Munish Sibal PVSM, AVSM** (retd)

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the process of expansion and reorganisation of Armed Forces started post 1962. This was still in process when the 1965 War started. However having learnt the lessons they were in a better state to fight which was evident during the war. The performance of Armed Forces during 1971 conflict bears testimony to the fact of our ability to give a crushing defeat to Pakistan which led to its bifurcation and creation of Bangladesh. Modernisation and restructuring of Armed forces is a continuous process which is based on various factors viz envisaged threat perception, geopolitical realities etc. This has enabled us to optimise our forces in a manner that the areas of responsibilities today are reduced and are much better managed.

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The 1965 INDO-PAK War No Victor No Vanquished? by Maj Gen raj Mehta AVSM, VSM (retd)

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Is this caption a fair, valid summation of the 1965 indo-Pak War?
Is it a judgement that needs reinterpretation? the writer critically examines the evidence available on record.
“Friends! There are no friends!”Aristotle.
“Because things are the way they are, things will not stay the way they are.”Bertolt Brecht.

 

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The Capture and Return of Hajipir pass - Myth and Reality by Maj Gen Sheru Thapliyal SM (retd)

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As far as the captured territory is concerned, it was decided that all territories across the International Border and ceasefire line will be returned and status quo ante will be restored. This posed a serious dilemma for the indian military establishment which had briefed the Prime Minister prior to his departure. However, allowing Pakistani dagger to keep pointing at Akhnoor and Jammu was thus both militarily and politically unacceptable. Shastri therefore, had no option but to agree to return Hajipir Pas.

 

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Celebrating Victory by Brig Chitranjan Sawant VSM (retd)

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General Ayub Khan had failed to assess his adversary, Shastriji. Shastriji was a votary of Ahimsa but once it came to killing the enemy to defend the motherland, he was second to none. Both Ayub and later Yahya made a mistake in assessing the fighting spirit of the Hindu soldier and what they mistakenly called Hindu India. With the result the puffed up Generals across the border lost all the wars they fought against Hindu India.

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Audacious Fortunes by Lt Col Rohit Agarwal (retd)

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three brave men across three theatres of operation, bound together by their audacity and good fortune. Each of them survived to personally play a significant role in ensuring ultimate victory for the country, providing decisive leadership at critical junctures. It was as if fortune was actually watching over them, indulgently placing a protective hand to keep them from harm’s way, knowing their sheer audacity would prevent them from looking out for themselves.

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